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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A jury found Mr. Watkins guilty of a single count of lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of sixteen for allegedly engaging in sex acts with his six year-old 
daughter. Mr. Watkins received a unified sentence of life, with fifteen years fixed. 
Mr. Watkins now appeals. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Watkins argued that his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront the witnesses against him was violated when, at trial, the district court allowed 
the State's DNA expert to testify about out-of-court statements made by one of her 
employees, a lab technician, relating to the manner in which he (the lab technician) 
handled and tested certain evidence. Specifically, Mr. Watkins argued that because the 
DNA expert's testimony was not based upon her own personal knowledge, but rather 
(a) her review of the lab technician's notes and (b) her conversations with that lab 
technician, admission of her testimony regarding the manner in which the lab technician 
handled and tested the evidence violated Mr. Watkin's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-10; 14-16.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Watkins' Sixth Amendment 
claim is procedurally barred because it was not preserved with a sufficiently specific 
objection below and because Confrontation Clause violations do not constitute 
fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-7.) The State further argued that even if 
Mr. Watkins' Confrontation Clause claim is properly considered on appeal, it fails 
because the out-of-court statements testified to by its DNA expert are not "testimonial" 
within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and, thus, 
Mr. Watkins had no Constitutional right to confront the declarant of those statements, 
the lab technician. 
In his Reply Brief, Mr. Watkins attempted to rebut both of the State's arguments. 
With regard to the procedural barrier which the State seeks to erect, Mr. Watkins 
pointed out that Confrontation Clause violations have already been held to be 
fundamental error in Idaho and that the State has offered no valid reason for overturning 
that precedent. (Reply Brief, pp.5-7.) With regard to the substantive issue, Mr. Watkins 
argued that the State's proffered analysis for determining whether statements are 
"testimonial" is based on a mischaracterization of the facts of this case and is 
inconsistent with the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court. (Reply 
Brief, pp.8-9.) 
Mr. Watkins' Reply Brief also raised a new argument which had been overlooked 
in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief. He argued that the DNA expert's testimony 
constituted inadmissible hearsay and ought to have been excluded under I.R.E. 801 
and 802.' (Reply Brief, p.10.) 
Upon receipt of Mr. Watkins' Reply Brief, the Court of Appeals issued an Order 
for Supplemental Briefing. The Court concluded that Mr. Watkins' briefing was 
"insufficient to adequately address either the Confrontation Clause issue raised in the 
Appellant's opening brief or the hearsay issue that the Appellant attempts to raise in his 
reply brief." (Order for Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17, 2007).) Specifically, the 
Court was concerned that, as to the Confrontation Clause argument, Mr. Watkins' 
briefing did not cite or analyze "any of the several decisions from other jurisdictions, 
issued since Davis v. Washington, - U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), addressing 
whether the Confrontation Clause bars admission of laboratory test reports, autopsy 
reports and similar evidence analogous to that presented in this case." (Order for 
Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17, 2007).) With regard to the hearsay issue, the Court 
was concerned that "the Appellant's hearsay argument is composed of a single 
paragraph in the reply brief." (Order for Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17, 2007)) 
The present Supplemental Brief seeks to address both of the Court's concerns. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincls 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in 
Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
1 Omission of this issue from Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief was the result of an oversight on the part of 
undersigned counsel. Undersigned counsel has previously apologized for any inconvenience this 
omission might have caused either the Court or the State. 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Watkins' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation violated through the 
district court's admission of Dr. Finis' testimony regarding things she had been 
told by her lab technician andlor his notes? 
2. Was Dr. Finis' testimony regarding things she had been told by her lab technician 
andlor his notes inadmissible hearsay? 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Watkins' Sixth Amendment Riaht to Confrontation Was Violated When Dr. Finis 
Was Allowed To Testifv As To Matters She Had Been Told By Her Lab Technician 
AndlOr Her His Notes 
A. Introduction 
In an effort to address the Court of Appeals' concern about the manner in which 
other jurisdictions have handled Confrontation Clause claims in a post-~avis' world, 
Mr. Watkins has surveyed approximately 130 cases from 45 jurisdictions3 that have 
addressed Confrontation Clause-based challenges to the government's use of 
documentary evidence (whether admitted in document form or testified to by a non- 
authoring witness) against the accused. Rather than limit himself to post-Davis cases. 
however, Mr. Watkins has also reviewed a large number of cases that arose in between 
Davis and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and, in limited situations, even 
some cases that arose prior to Crawford. This more expansive review was necessary 
to provide this Court with a clearer picture of how Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
has changed, and is still changing, in the various jurisdictions after the watershed 
Crawford case. 
The approximately 130 cases reviewed by Mr. Watkins are summarized without 
argument in the attached appendices. Thus, what follows in the, body of this 
Supplemental Brief is Mr. Watkins' argument about those cases. That argument is 
broken down as follows: in Part I(B), Mr. Watkins discusses the United States Supreme 
2 
3 
Davis v. Washington, - U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
The vast majority of the cases reviewed (approximately 118 of them) are from Idaho's sister states (36 
other states and the District of Columbia). These decisions are summarized in Appendix A. The rest of 
5 
Court's Crawford and Davis decisions and the extent to which those cases have given 
this court guidance as to the definition of "testimonial hearsay;" in Part I(C), Mr. Watkins 
points out that the most common thread among the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause 
cases is that, in defining testimonial hearsay, they tend to focus on the purpose for 
which the out-of-court statements at issue are made; in Part I(D), Mr. Watkins identifies 
the alternative standards for determining whether an out-of-court statement is 
testimonial and he points out the flaws in such standards; finally, in Part !(E), 
Mr. Watkins argues in summation that because the out-court-statements at issue in this 
case were clearly made in anticipation of litigation, they were testimonial statements 
under Crawford and Davis and, thus, ought not to have been admitted against 
Mr. Watkins. 
6. Crawford And Davis Charted A New Direction In Confrontation Clause 
Jurisprudence 
The Confrontation Clause states as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. 
CONST., amend. VI. Prior to Crawford, this meant that, although the criminal defendant 
generally had a right to confront and cross-examine the government's witnesses, an 
unavailable witness' out-of-court statements could be used against the defendant if they 
bore sufficient indicia of reliability, such as if they fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay 
exception." ~ober ts  v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
In 2004, the Supreme Court swept away the Roberts standard for "testimonial 
hearsay," replacing it with a strict confrontation requirement, for the following reason: 
the cases reviewed are from the (10 cases) are from the federal courts (seven federal circuits and the 
armed forces) These decisions are summarized in Appendix 0. 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries 
of the rules of evidence, much less amorphous notion of "reliability." ... 
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds 
with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to 
ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but 
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible 
of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about 
the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little 
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined .... 
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the 
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It 
thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing 
reliability with a wholly foreign one.. . . 
Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously 
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62. Ultimately, the Court held that under the Confrontation 
Clause, no "testimonial" out-of-court statement can be admitted against a criminal 
defendant unless the government can demonstrate that: (a) the declarant of the 
statement is "unavailable" for trial, and (b) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross 
examine that declarant. Id. at 68. 
Thus, a key inquiry in any Confrontation Clause case now is whether the out-of- 
court statement at issue is "testimonial." The Crawford Court declined to "spell out a 
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. However, it did 
say that, at a minimum, both ex patte testimony at a preliminary hearing and statements 
made in response to a police interrogation are testimonial. Id. at 52. The Court also 
recognized that "testimonial" statements may be given one of three definitions, although 
it did not necessarily endorse any of them: (a) the functional equivalent of ex parte in- 
court testimony, "such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorily;" (b) "extrajudicial statements ... 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions;" and (c) "statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an object~ve witness reasonably to believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later date." Id. at 51-52 (quoting various sources). Finally, the 
Court noted in dicta that "[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by 
their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy," but it did not explain this comment any f~ r the r .~  Id. at 56. 
Davis V. Washington, - U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), and a companion 
case, Hammon v. Indiana, the Court had occasion to revisit and further define 
"testimonial." In Davis, although the Court again declined to "produce an exhaustive 
classification of all conceivable statements" that would be considered testimonial, it held 
that, at least when it comes to statements made to the police, those statements are 
testimonial "when the circumstances objectively indicate that ... the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution." Id. at 2273-2274. 
Based on Crawford and Davis, Mr. Watkins has already argued that the key to 
determining whether a statement is testimonial is whether it is made in anticipation of 
litigation; he has argued that statements made in anticipation of litigation are testimonial 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented from the majority's decision to overrule Roberts, seized upon 
this dicta as a limitation of the Court's holding: "To its credit, the Court's analysis of 'testimony' excludes 
at least some hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official records. To hold otherwise 
under Crawford: "Although Mr. Channell's statements in this case were made to Dr. 
Finis instead of the police, they are testimonial under Crawford and Davis/Hammon 
because, at the time that those statements were made, it was objectively clear that they 
were being made to establish facts for future use in prosecuting Mr. ~a f k i ns . "~  
(Appellant's Brief, p.15 (emphasis added); see also Reply Brief, p.9 ("[Tlhe question of 
whether statements are 'testimonial' turns largely upon whether they are intended to be 
used prosecutorily.").) As the following section makes clear, a survey of approximately 
I30  cases from 45 other jurisdictions reveals that most courts would probably agree. 
C. The Most Common Thread Amonu The Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause 
Cases Is That. In Definina Testimonial Hearsav,  the^ Tend To Focus On The 
Purpose For Which The Out-Of-Court Statement At Issue Is Made 
There is no denying that the cases discussed in the appendices are "all over the 
map" in terms of their approaches to defining testimonial statements. However, the 
most common thread among these cases is the focus on the question of whether the 
out-of-court statement at issue was made in anticipation of litigation. Thus, whether it is 
the sole factor considered or just one of multiple factors considered, a strikingly large 
number of cases have considered the question of whether the out-of-court statement at 
issue was made in anticipation of litigation to be critical in determining whether that 
statement is testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. Salina-Valenciano, 220 Fed. Appx. 
879, 882 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion) ("The key question under Crawford is 
whether the document sought to be introduced was prepared for the purpose of 
litigation, or whether it was prepared for regulatory, business, or other purposes apart 
would require numerous additional witnesses without any apparent gain in the truth-seeking process." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
from the possibility of its use as evidence in a legal proceeding."); United States v. 
Magyar;, 63 M.J. 123, 126-27 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that although lab reports may be 
considered business records under the Military Rules of Evidence, they "may become 
testimonial where a defendant is already under investigation, and where the testing is 
initiated by the prosecution to discover incriminating evidence); United States v. Rankin, 
63 M.J. 552, 554 (N-M.C. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (finding certain ,personnel records to be 
nontestimonial, partly because they were not prepared by law enforcement personnel or 
prosecutorial authorities for court-martial proceedings, and partly because they were 
"objective in nature"); United States v. Wahila, 2006 WL 3523771, *I (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. Nov. 17, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (adhering to the reasoning of Magyari, 
supra); Bohsancutf v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 474-480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (finding 
certain breath test machine maintenance and calibration records to be nontestimonial 
because they were not created in anticipation of litigation or with any particular 
defendant or case in mind); People v. Mitchell, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1222-1223 
(2005) ("In evaluating the admissibility of business records, courts have generally 
looked to the purpose for which a document was produced. If a record was produced 
'with an eye toward trial' or specifically for use in a criminal prosecution, however, courts 
have generally found the record testimonial."); People v. Taulton, 129 Cal. App. 4th 
1218, 1224 (2005) (holding that a statement is testimonial if "it was obtained for the 
purpose of potentially using it in a criminal trial or determining if a criminal charge 
should issue."); Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 938 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that DNA technicians' and analysts work was testimonial because it was 
Relying upon the Crawford Court's dicta, the State contends, in part, that the appropriate test is not 
whether the statement in question was made in anticipation of litigation, but whether that statement might 
prepared at the government's request specifically for a criminal case); Thomas v. United 
States, 914 A.2d 1, 12-15 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006) (considering Crawford and Davis and 
holding that, "because DEA chemists' reports are created expressly for use in criminal 
prosecutions as a substitute for live testimony against the accused, such reports are 
testimonial, whether or not they happen to meet this jurisdiction's definition of a 
business record"); Martin v. State, 936 So.2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a 
lab report to be testimonial where it was prepared for purposes of litigation); Williams v. 
State, 933 So.2d 1283, 1284-1285 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an affidavit from a 
breath test technician, summarizing her observations, the testing procedures employed, 
and the results obtained, was testimonial because its purpose was to generate evidence 
for use at trial); Sobota v. State, 933 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a 
lab report to be testimonial where it was prepared for purposes of litigation); Belvin v. 
State, 922 So.2d 1046, 1050-52 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc) (holding that an affidavit 
from a breath test technician, summarizing her observations, the testing procedures 
employed, and the results obtained, was testimonial because its purpose was to 
generate evidence for use at trial); Johnson v. State, 929 So.2d 4, 7-8 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding a lab report to be testimonial where its purpose was to establish an 
element of the crime at trial); Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617-618 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that where statements made about the performance testing and 
maintenance of breath test machines were made by the police for the sole purpose of 
being used at trial, those statements are testimonial); Rackoff v. State, 281 637 S.E.2d 
706, 709 (Ga. 2006) (holding that an inspection certificate for a breath test machine was 
nontestimonial because it was not prepared for use in the prosecution of a particular 
be considered a business record. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8; 10; 12; 14-17.) 
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defendant); State v. Marshall, 2007 WL 1793875, *4-5 (Haw. Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2007) 
(not yet final) (holding that documents relating to the testing and calibration of a breath 
test machine are nontestimonial because they are not created for use against a 
particular defendant or as part of a particular investigation); People v. Kim, 859 N E.2d 
92, 93-94 (111. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an affidavit attesting to the testing and 
maintenance of a breath test machine is nontestimonial, in part because such affidavits 
are not prepared during the course of an investigation of a particular crime and are not 
prepared for use against a particular defendant); Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E. 2d 1022, 
1025-1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that documents related to the inspection and 
function of breath test analysis machines are nontestimonial because they are not 
created for use in any particular criminal case); Rembusch v. State, 836 N.E. 2d 979, 
982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (same); Sfate v. Shipley, - N.W. 2d -, 2007 WL 911894, *5-6 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2007) (holding that a driving record abstract was testimonial because it was 
specifically prepared for use against the defendant); State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 
753-754 (holding that medical records, including blood test results, were nontestimonial 
because they were created years before the crime at issue and, thus, were not created 
for use against the defendant in a particular case); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 
S.W.3d 570, 575 (2006) (holding that documents related to the maintenance and 
performance of breath test analysis machines are nontestimonial because their use 
against the defendant in a criminal case was "incidental"); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 
2006 WL 891 110, *3-4 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that 
the victim's medical records in a rape case were nontestimonial, partly because the 
purpose in their creation was to provide medical care to the victim, not generate 
evidence in a criminal case); State v. Leonard, 2006 WL 3813680, *7-9 (La. Ct. App. 
2006) (holding an autopsy report to be nontestimonial, partly because they are not 
necessarily prepared for a particular case against a particular defendant); Rollins v. 
State, 897 A.2d 821, 838-39 (Md. Ct. App. 2006) (same); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 
610, 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a crime lab serologist's notes were 
testimonial because they were made by the government for use in a criminal 
prosecution); State v. Sickmann, 2006 WL 3593042, "3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that a certification as to the qualifications of a nurse was 
testimonial because it was created for prosecutorial use); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 
304, 309 (2006) (noting that "the critical determinative factor in assessing whether a 
statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation," and holding that the 
lab report at issue was therefore testimonial); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666-667 
(Mo. 2007) ("When a laboratory report is created for the purpose of prosecuting a 
criminal defendant, like this one was, it is testimonial."); State v. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d 
613, 622 (Neb. 2007) (holding that a certificate of calibration for tuning forks was 
nontestimonial because it was created to ensure the accuracy of the tuning forks, not for 
use in a criminal prosecution); State v. Fischer, 726 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Neb. 2007) 
(holding that a company's certificate, revealing the composition and concentration of a 
certain solution, was nontestimonial because it was created for administrative purposes, 
not for use in a criminal prosecution); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899, 124 
P.3d 203, 208 (Nev. 2005) (holding that an affidavit stating the procedures followed in 
obtaining a blood test was testimonial because it was created for use at trial); State v. 
Dorman, -A.2d -, 2007 WL 1373192, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 11, 2007) 
(holding that documents certifying the good working order of a breath test machine are 
nontestimonial because they are not created for use in any specific case); State v. Kent, 
918 A.2d 626, 636-640 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding that a certification 
stating the procedures followed in obtaining a blood test was testimonial because it was 
created for use at trial); State V.  Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1087 (N.J. Super Ct. App. 
Div. 2007) (holding that a certification stating the procedures followed in obtaining a 
blood test was testimonial because it was created for use at trial); People v. Pacer, 814 
N.Y.S.2d 575, 577-580 (2006) (holding that an affidavit describing New York's 
procedures for notifying driver's that their privileges have been revoked was testimonial, 
in part because it was created at the government's request and with the specific 
intention that it would be used in a criminal case); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 
772, 780-783 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 2005) (holding that documents evidencing the 
testing and calibration of a breath test machine were nontestimonial because they were 
not "made primarily for litigation purposes"); People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512 (J. Ct. 
2005) (holding that documents evidencing the testing and calibration of a breath test 
machine were testimonial because they were made for litigation purposes); People v. 
Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2005) (holding that an autopsy report 
was nontestimonial, primarily because it was not manufactured for the benefit of the 
prosecution); People v. Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d 788,789 (Sup Ct. N.Y. County 2005) 
(holding that a fingerprint report was testimonial because it was prepared "with the 
ultimate goal of apprehending and successfully prosecuting a defendant"); People v. 
Capellan, 791 N.Y.S.2d 325, 317 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. City 2004) (holding that an affidav~t, 
attesting to the fact that a driver's license suspension order had been properly mailed to 
the defendant, was testimonial, in large part because it "was created expressly for use 
in this litigation"); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396-397 (3d Dept. 2004) 
(holding that a blood test report prepared by a private lab was testimonial because it 
was prepared at the request of law enforcement for use in a criminal case); Village of 
Granville v. Graziano, 2007 WL 764765, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Mar. 14, 2007) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that breath test machine calibration and testing 
documents are nontestimonial, partly because they are not created for investigation or 
prosecution purposes); Village of Granville v. Eastman, 2006 WL 3422272, *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App., 5th Dist. Nov. 27, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (same); State v. Smith, 2006 WL 
846342 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist Apr. 3, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a lab 
report was testimonial because it was prepared as part of an investigation in a criminal 
case); State v. Crager, 164 Ohio App. 3d 816, 823, 825, 844 N.E.2d 390, 396, 397 
(Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2005) (holding that a DNA analyst's report was testimonial 
because it "was prepared as part of a police investigation" and because a reasonable 
person would have expected it to have been used in a subsequent trial); State v. Cook, 
2005 WL 736671, *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 31, 2005) (unpublished opinion) 
(holding that breath test machine calibration and testing documents are nontestimonial, 
partly because they are not created for investigation or prosecution purposes); State v. 
Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that lab reports were 
testimonial because they were analogous to responses to police questioning and 
because they were created for use in criminal prosecutions); State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 
15, 18-20 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that documents certifying the accuracy of a 
breath test machine were nontestimonial because they were not created as part of a 
criminal investigation and, thus, were more like traditional business records); State v. 
Warlick, 2007 WL 1439648, *6 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. May 17, 2007) (unpublished 
opinion) (holding the defendant's medical records were nontestimonial, partly because 
they were not created for the purpose of prosecuting her); see also State v. Hawkins, 
2007 WL 61874, *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan 9, 2007) (not reaching the issue, but noting 
that the government had conceded that a crime lab report was testimonial because it 
was intended for use at trial). 
Of course, as noted above, there is no consensus among the courts. Some 
courts have eschewed the "purposes of litigation" standard for defining testimonial 
hearsay and have chosen to invoke any number of rationales for finding the 
government's evidence to be nontestimonial and, thereby, avoiding Crawford's strict 
confrontation requirement. However, as is set forth fully below, none of those rationales 
are particularly convincing. 
D Those Cases Which Have Souaht To Define Testimonial Hearsay In Terms 
Other Than The Purpose For Which The Out-Of-Court Statement In Question 
Was Made, Are Generallv Unconvincing 
Of the many cases surveyed by Mr. Watkins, many have sought to resolve the 
"testimonial" question in terms other than whether the statement at issue was made for 
purposes of investigation or prosecution. These alternative analyses are identified and 
discussed below. 
1. Althouah Some Courts Have Held That Lab Re~orts And Other 
Documents Proffered Bv The Government Aaainst The Accused Are 
"Business Records" And. Therefore, Exempt From The Confrontation 
Clause. Those Decisions Flv In The Face Of Crawford And History 
Relying on Crawford's dicta concerning business records6 and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's extension of that dicta to public records in his dissent,' numerous courts 
have held that Crawford specifically exempted from the Confrontation Clause any and 
all documents which might be considered business or public records (under the 
evidentiary rules of the jurisdiction). See, e.g., Unitedstates v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924- 
927 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant's medical records, including lab reports, 
which had been created during the course of a criminal investigation, were 
nontestimonial simply because they were created in the normal course of the hospital 
and the lab's business); United States v. Centantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 832-834 
(2005) (holding that an affidavit certifying to the nonexistence of an immigration record 
was nontestimonial because it "closely resembles" a business record); United States v. 
Mendoza-Orellana, 133 Fed. Appx 68, 70 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) 
(adhering to a Fifth Circuit decision which had held that an affidavit certifying to the 
nonexistence of an immigration record was nontestimonial because it was a public 
record under the Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 
678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that an affidavit certifying the nonexistence of an 
immigration record was nontestimonial because it was a public record under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence); People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 26-37 (Colo. Ct. App. 
' "Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for 
yxample, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
"To its credit, the Court's analysis of 'testimony' excludes at least some hearsay exceptions, such as 
business records and official records." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
2005), ce& granted, 2006 WL 2338141 (Colo. Aug. 14, 2006) (claiming that the 
"majority of jurisdictions hold that laboratory reports and similar documents are 
nontestimonial business or public records); People v. Schreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060- 
1061 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that documents evidencing the defendant's prior 
convictions were nontestimonial, in part because they were analogous to business 
records); People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (111. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an 
affidavit attesting to the testing and maintenance of a breath test machine is 
nontestimonial, in part because "Crawford specifically disclaims any intention to restrict 
traditional hearsay exceptions" and breath test machine logs fit the business records 
exception under Illinois law); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 
2005) ("One acknowledged exception to the confrontation clause is a public record ...."); 
State V. Godshalk, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 2005) (holding that 
breath test machine inspection reports are business or official records under the New 
Jersey Rules of Evidence and, as a consequence, they are necessarily 
nonte~timonial);~ People v. Meekins, 828 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84-85 (2d Dept. 2006) (holding 
that a DNA report was nontestimonial because "business records are 'by their nature ... 
not testimonial"'); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ohio 2006) ("[Alutopsy records 
are admissible as nontestimonial business records."); State v. Cook, 2005 WL 736671, 
*3-4 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 31, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that breath 
test machine calibration and testing documents are nontestimonial, in part because they 
are business records under state law); Sfate V. Cutro, 618 S E.2d 890, 895-896 (S.C. 
2005) (holding, as a bright line rule, that documents which constitute business or official 
Godshalk's reasoning has since been rejected by the New Jersey courts. See State v. Dorman, - A.2d 
-, 2007 WL 1373192, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 11,2007.) 
records under state law, are exempt from confrontation ); Mitchell v. State, 191 S.W.3d 
219, 221-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an autopsy report was nontestimonial 
because, as business records under Texas law, they are categorically exempt from the 
Confrontation Clause); Eslora v. Sfate, 2005 WL 763233, *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2005) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that the defendant's medical records are nontestimonial 
because they are business records under Texas law); Riner v. Commonwealth, 601 
S.E.2d 555, 570 (Va. 2004) (stating in dicfa that business records were specifically 
exempted from the Confrontation Clause in Crawford); Sfate v. Kronich, 128 P.3d 119, 
122-123 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that documents which are considered business 
or public records under Washington law are necessarily nontestimonial); State v. 
N. M. K., 129 Wash. App. 155, 163, 1 18 P.3d 268, 372 (2005) (same). 
Such interpretations of Crawford, while tempting because of their simplicity, are 
wholly unsupportable. Preliminarily, the language relied upon consists of nothing more 
than dicta and a dissent, neither of which has any precedential value. 
Moreover, to the extent that the majority's dicfa offers any insight into the 
meaning of "testimonial," since it is unaccompanied by any analysis or explanation, it 
ought not to be taken as a bright-line exemption for an entire class of out-of-court 
statements. See People v. Mitchell, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1222-23, (2005) ("In 
Crawford, the Supreme Court noted business records were one example of hearsay 
statements that by their nature were not testimonial. By this the Court could not have 
meant all documentary evidence which could broadly qualify in some context as a 
business record should automatically be considered non-testimonial.") Rather, it should 
be taken for what it is: recognition of the unremarkable proposition that most business 
records are, by their very nature created prior to any investigation of any alleged 
criminal activity and, thus, nontestimonial. Indeed, such an interpretation makes sense 
given that the Crawford Court specifically divorced the Confrontation Clause analysis 
from the hearsay rules. 
Finally, even if the Crawford Court's dicfa can be taken literally, we still have to 
discern what it meant when it spoke of "business records." Did it mean "business 
records" as defined by the different state's evidentiary rules? Did it mean "business 
records" as defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence? Or did it mean "business 
records" as defined by the common law? Surely, the Supreme Court did not mean for 
the contours of the United States Constitution's Confrontation Clause to vary depending 
on how each state interprets its own evidentiary rules.g Almost equally improbable is 
the notion that the Supreme Court meant for the scope of the Clause to be dependent 
upon its own court ru~es. '~  
indeed, a much more reasonable interpretation of Crawford is that when the 
Court spoke of business records, it was talking about business records as defined by 
the common law. And, under the common law, documents created in anticipation of 
litigation were not considered business or public records. In Thomas v. United Sfates, 
914 A.2d 1 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that 
the business records exception that the Crawford Court spoke of-that which existed in 
9 Of course, as noted in Mr. Watkins' Reply Brief, if this were the case, the statements at issue in this 
case would still call for confrontation because ldaho law provides that statements generated for litigation 
are not business records under L.R.E. 803(6). State v. SandovaCTena, 138 ldaho 908, 91 1-912, 71 P.3d 
1055, 1058-1059 (2003). 
10 Although clearly referring to the pre-Federal Rules era, one Court noted that, "[rlecords prepared in 
anticipation of litigation traditionally have been deemed outside the reach of the business records 
exception. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-1 14, 63 S. Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943) ... ." State v. 
Williams, 644 N.W.2d 919, 929 (Wis. 2002). 
1791-"was a very narrow one." Id. at 13. "Traditionally, the historical business records 
exception did not encompass records prepared for use in litigation, let alone records 
produced ex parte by government agents for later use in criminal prosecutions." Id.; see 
also State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666-667 (Mo. 2007) (citing Thomas for the 
proposition that "the business record exception in 1791 was a very narrow one"). 
The Oregon Court of Appeals also addressed this issue, examining the origins of 
the business record exception to the hearsay rule in great detail and concluding, as had 
the Thomas Court, business records at common law did not include documents 
prepared by the government for use in a criminal prosecution: 
On reflection, we now believe that the Court in Crawford, in suggesting 
that records under the business records exception of the hearsay rule 
would not be considered "testimonial," did not have in mind the type of 
record at issue here, viz., a lab report prepared for use against a criminal 
defendant in a specific criminal prosecution. That is so because such a 
record did not fit the common-law exception for business records that 
would have been familiar to the framers of the Sixth Amendment. 
State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
2. Althouah Some Courts Have Held That Lab Reports And Other 
Documents Proffered Bv The Government Aclainst The Accused Are 
Nontestimonial Because Thev Are Reliable, Those Decisions Fly In The 
Face Of Crawford Itself 
Some courts have said that out-of-court statements contained in documents 
(such as lab reports) are nontestimonial if they "objectively" report "facts," as opposed to 
subjectively providing a narrative or offering an opinion. See, e.g., People v. Hinojos- 
Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30, 26-37 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), cert granted, 2006 WL 2338141 
(Colo. Aug. 14, 2006) (holding that a lab report showing the weight and chemical 
composition of a suspected controlled substance was non-testimonial, in part because it 
concerned "a routine laboratory procedure"); State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kan. 
2005) (holding that autopsy results are non-testimonial, in part because "autopsy 
reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body in an 
environment where the medical examiner would have little incentive to fabricate 
results"); State V. Anderson, 942 So.2d 625, 629 (La. Ci. App. 2006) (in part, adopting 
the reasoning of Lackey); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 839-846 (Md. Ct. App. 2006) 
(adopting the reasoning of Lackey in holding that those portions of an autopsy report 
which merely provide "findings about the physical condition of the decedent that may be 
fairly characterized as routine, descriptive and not analytical" are nontestimonial); 
Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (holding that a report of a 
chemical analysis on suspected controlled substances is nontestimonial, in part 
because it "merely stateis] the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the 
composition and quantity of the substance," and is "neither discretionary nor based on 
opinion"); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (holding that a lab report 
concerning the defendant's blood alcohol level was nontestimonial, in part because "the 
process is routine, non-adversarial, and made to ensure accurate measurement"); 
State v. Cao, 626 S.E.2d 301, 303-305 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that lab notes and 
a lab report concerning the chemical composition of a suspected controlled substance 
were nontestimonial insofar as they contained "objective facts" obtained through 
"mechanical means"); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143-144 (N.C. 2006) (holding that 
lab reports concerning the handling and testing of serological samples were 
nontestimonial, in part because they were "neutral" in the sense that they had the power 
to either convict or exonerate, depending on how they turned out, because they 
concerned "routine," "ministerial," "nonadversarial" matters, and because they were "not 
inherently subject to manipulation or abuse"); Grant v. State, 218 S.W.3d 225, 230-32 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing disciplinary records and explaining that "[iln Ford, the 
statements in the disciplinary reports were objective statements ... ; they were not 
narratives by witnesses against the appellant relating to his guilt or innocence of the 
infractions described. Consequently, the statements were non-testimonial.. . . In 
contrast, the statements in Russeau contained subjective narrations"); Johnson v. Stafe, 
2006 WL 1738288, *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that 
medical records, including a DNA report, were nontestimonial, in part because they 
related to physical evidence collected during the investigation and they set forth 
observations made pursuant to a duty imposed by law); Nieschwietz v. State, 2006 WL 
1684739, *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun 21, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a vehicle 
registration is nontestimonial, in part because it conveys "objective and historical 
information," as opposed to "subjective observations"); Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 
209 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that disciplinary reports were nontestimonial because 
they were nothing more than "sterile recitations of appellant's offense and the 
punishments he received for those offenses"); Michels v. Commonwealth, 624 S.E.2d 
675, 680 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a certification from the secretary of state was 
nontestimonial, in part because it was "prepared in a non-adversarial setting in which 
'the factors likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more traditional 
law enforcement functions or observation and investigation of crime are simply not 
present"'); Commonwealfh v. Williams, 69 Va. Cir. 277, 2005 WL 3007781, '3 (2005) 
(holding that a lab report concerning the composition and weight of a suspected 
controlled substance was nontestimonial because it was "routine," nondiscretionary, 
"state[d] the results of a well recognized scientific test"). 
In addition, some courts have said that out-of-court statements contained in 
documents (such as lab reports) are nontestimonial if they come from what is perceived 
to be an independent, objective source. See, e.g., State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 
(N.M. 2004) (holding that a lab report concerning the defendant's blood alcohol level 
was nontestimonial, in part because the toxicologist who prepared the report, although a 
government employee, was not a police officer); State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 435-437, 
629 S.E.2d 137, 143-144 (N.C. 2006) (holding that lab reports concerning the handling 
and testing of serological samples were nontestimonial, in part because, although they 
were prepared by a law enforcement officer, that officer "had no interest in the outcome 
of any trial"); Michels v. Commonwealth, 624 S.E.2d 675, 680 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that a certification from the secretary of state was nontestimonial, in part 
because the secretary of state is neutral and its statements are objective). 
Both types of decisions, however, are clearly premised upon nothing more than a 
presumption of reliability-whether it be a presumption of an "objective" statement's 
reliability or a presumption of a "neutral" declarant's reliability. In other words, while 
these cases speak in terms of "testimonial hearsay," and while they correctly cite 
Crawford and Davis, it is abundantly clear that they are still caught up in Roberts' old 
"reliability" standard, a standard which was unequivocally rejected in Crawford. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62. Indeed as the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
observed in Thomas, supra, "the neutrality and trustworthiness of [government experts] 
and their reports are beside the point after Crawford. Reliability no longer shields 
testimony from confrontation. AS Crawford makes clear, '[dlispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."' 
Thomas, 914 A.2d at 15 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62). 
Moreover, the right to confrontation is more than a mere technicality; there are 
practical problems with presuming reliability. First, even if the declarant is truly neutral 
and truthful, that fact does not guarantee that there is nothing to be gained from cross- 
examination. This is particularly true with regard to statements concerning scientific 
testing (such as those made in lab reports), where there may be issues involving the 
storage and handling of samples, the environmental conditions present at various times, 
the testing techniques employed, and methods of measuring and recording results. For 
example, as one court has observed, "the manner in which a blood sample is collected 
and handled may be critical to the outcome of the subsequent scientific testing of that 
sample and, thus, the outcome of the case." State v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1088 
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
This concern is not unique to cases involving scientific testing though. In 
People v. pacer," for example, New York's highest court had occasion to consider an 
affidavit identifying New York State's procedures for notifying drivers of the suspension 
of their driver's licenses and stating, upon "information and belief," that those 
procedures had been followed in the defendant's case. The Pacer Court noted that the 
affiant's veracity was not the only concern; the defendant had legitimate lines of cross- 
examination touching upon the possibility that an error or oversight had occurred: 
" People v Pacer, 814 N.Y. S.2d 575 (2006) 
Without an opportunity to cross-examine the affiant, defendant had no 
chance to inquire about the basis for the affiant's "information and belief' 
that the Department mailed the notice. Defendant had no chance to 
inquire whether the Department sometimes makes mistakes in mailing 
revocation notices; whether there were other drivers in the Department's 
database with the same name as defendant to whom the Department 
might have mailed the notice; to what address the affiant believed, based 
on her information, the Department had mailed the notice; whether the 
notice might have been returned undelivered; or whether the affiant could 
testify reliably about procedures as they existed 16 years earlier. In 
short, the lack of a live witness to confront eliminated defendant's 
opportunity to contest a decisive piece of evidence against him. This is 
exactly the evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent. 
Pacer, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80 (2006 
Second, it is na'ive to assume that a government expert, or even an independent 
expert retained by the government, could never misstate the facts or, at least, shade the 
truth. As one court has noted, "'[a]lthough business and public records generally may 
bear adequate indicia of reliability, laboratory reports may not. Laboratory reports 
typically are prepared in anticipation of prosecution and, although probably rare, they 
can be falsified."' State v. Williams, 644 N.W.2d 919, 929 (Wis. 2002) (quoting I 
Scientific Evidence § 6.4(C), at 329) 
The bottom line is that a presumption of reliability is a poor substitute for 
assessing the reliability of the government's witnesses' statements in the manner 
prescribed by the Constitution-in the crucible of cross-examination. It is contrary to the 
Sixth Amendment and it overlooks the unfortunate reality that "government forensic 
laboratories are not immune from problems of dishonesty, sloppiness, poor training, 
bias, unsound methodology, and scientific or other error." Thomas, 914 A.2d at 14-15 & 
n.16. 
3. Althouah Some Courts Have Held That Lab Reports And Other 
Documents Proffered Bv The Government Aaainst The Accused Are 
Nontestimonial Because Thev Consist Of Neither Prior Testimony Nor 
Statements Given In Response To Police lnterroqation Are 
Nontestimonial. Those Decisions Are Un~ersuasive 
As noted above, in Crawford, the Supreme Court held that "[wlhatever else the 
term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court set the floor for finding 
statements to be testimonial, not the ceiling. 
Nevertheless, a small number of Texas cases have apparently interpreted the 
above language as providing the only possible definition of testimonial hearsay and 
have rejected Confrontation Clause claims on the basis that the statements at issue 
were neither prior testimony nor the product of police interrogations. Denoso v. State, 
156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (autopsy report); Mifchell v. State, 191 
S.W.3d 219, 222-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (autopsy report); Johnson v. State, 2006 WL 
1738288, *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2006 (unpublished opinion) (medical report, 
including DNA test results). 
These Texas cases are remarkable for reading the "at a minimum" language right 
out of Crawford, and for missing the Court's express acknowledgment that there are as- 
yet-unidentified classes of testimonial statements that will have to be hashed out in 
future case. Accordingly, these cases hold no persuasive value whatsoever. 
4. Althouah Some Courts Have Held That Lab Reports And Other 
Documents Proffered Bv The Government In An Effort To Lay A Foundat 
ion For Other Evidence Are Nontestimonial, Those Decisions Are 
Unsound 
A handful of decisions have sought to distinguish between substantive evidence 
and foundational evidence, reasoning that the accused need not be provided an 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine those whose out-of-court statements are 
used for foundational purposes because that evidence is somehow less important than 
"substantive evidence." See, e.g., People v. Schreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060-1061 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that affidavits attesting to the authenticity of documents 
evidencing the defendant's prior convictions were nontestimonial because "[ilt is 
underlying documentary evidence and not the authenticating affidavits, that reference 
(and are thus used to prove) the facts material to habitual criminal proceedings, namely, 
a defendant's prior convictions"); State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) 
(holding that documents certifying to the accuracy of breath test machines were non- 
testimonial because they were "not substantive evidence of a particular offense, but 
rather ... foundational evidence necessary for the admission of substantive evidence"); 
State v. Palestino, 2006 WL 2807035, "2 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2006) (unpublished 
opinion) (following Delaney, infra, and Walker, infra; noting that it is well-settled (by 
state court decisions which pre-date Crawford) that an expert may base his or her 
opinion on tests performed by another; and holding that the notes and reports of a lab 
technician were nontestimonial when introduced through the testimony of an expert); 
State v. Durham, 625 S.E. 2d 831, 834-35 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an autopsy 
report was nontestimonial because it was not offered for the trtith of the matters 
asserted therein, but rather to demonstrate the basis of the testifying expert's opinion as 
to the victim's cause of death); State v. Lyles, 615 S.E. 2d 890, 892-894 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that lab reports concerning the testing of suspected controlled 
substances were nontestimonial when offered through a testifying expert because the 
reports were admitted as the basis of the expert's opinions); State v. Delaney, 613 S.E. 
2d 699, 700-701 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Sfate v. Walker, 613 S.E. 2d 330, 332- 
333 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a ballistics report was nontestimonial when 
offered through a testifying expert because the report was admitted as the basis of the 
testifying expert's opinion and because it corroborated the testifying expert's opinion); 
State v. Jones, 2004 WL 1964890, * 4 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2004) (unpublished 
opinion) (same as Lyles and Delaney). 
The logic of these cases is unsound. First, as a technical matter, any attempt to 
distinguish between "substantive evidence" and "foundational evidence" is unavailing 
since the two terms are not mutually exclusive. In fact, "foundational evidence," which 
is defined as "[elvidence that determines the admissibility of other evidence," will 
virtually always be substantive evidence, which is defined as "[elvidence offered to help 
establish a fact in issue, as opposed to evidence directed to impeach or support a 
witness' credibility," although substantive evidence will not always be foundational 
evidence. See BLACKS' LAW DICTIONARY 597, 599-600 (8th ed. 2004). 
Second, as more of a practical matter, so-called "foundational evidence" is no 
less valuable than "substantive evidence" because it is a necessary prerequisite to 
admission of that evidence. Indeed, without it, we cannot be sure that the "substantive 
evidence" is what it is held out to be. For example, with regard to the North Carolina 
cases cited above, without the "foundational evidence," the underlying data and the 
circumstances surrounding its collection, we are left with expert opinions in vacuums, 
which are both irrelevant and of unknown (and unchallengeable) reliability. 
Thus, contrary to some courts' contentions, "foundational evidence" is no less 
valuable, no less testimonial, and, certainly, no less demanding of cross-examination, 
than "substantive evidence." 
5. Althouah Some Courts Have Held That Lab Re~orts And Other 
Documents Proffered BV The Government Are Nontestimonial Because, 
To Hold Otherwise, Would Be To Impose An Undue Burden On The 
Government. Those Decisions Are Contrarv To Crawford, Davis. And The 
Confrontation Clause Itself 
Two courts are remarkable for unabashedly admitting that they found out-of-court 
s. .,emr.nts be nontestimonial, in part, to make it easier for the government to obtain 
cP ,tic . n State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 352 (Kan. 2005), for example, the 
Kansas Si!p,ame Court held that an autopsy report was non-testimonial, in part, 
u I?? autopsy reports to be festimonial would be to impose a great burden on 
: 20 'rnrne.lt, which would have to call the pathologist who did the autopsy in every 
cas; --id, st pathologist was unavailable, might have a hard time prosecuting some 
homicice caszs. Following Lackey's lead, the Maryland Cour! of Appeals held similarly 
(again, with regard to an autopsy report), stating that losing a homicide prosecution due 
to the death of a government witness would be "unacceptable." Rollins v. State, 897 
A.2d 821, 845 (Md. Ct. App. 2006). 
Lackey and Rollins are patently absurd. Nowhere does Crawford, Davis, or the 
Confrontation Clause provide a confrontation exception for the convenience of the 
government. Indeed, nowhere does any portion of the United States Constitution 
provide for a goilernmental right to obtain a conviction, much less one which might 
trump a defendant's right to confrontation. 
Because, as one New Jersey court sensibly noted, "[u]nquestionably, those 
decisions [Crawford and a New Jersey case] compel the conclusion that practical 
considerations must yield to constitutional imperatives when the two collide," State v. 
Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1088 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007), it is clear that Lackey 
and Rollins are without merit. 
E. Conclusion: Because The Out-Of-Court Statements Testified To By The State's 
DNA Expert Were Made For Prosecutorial Purposes, They Were Testimonial 
And, Therefore, Inadmissible Aaainst Mr. Watkins 
As discussed in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief, the DNA lab technician's 
statements (made in his bench notes and during his telephone calls with the State's 
DNA expert, and testified to by the DNA expert) about how he handled and tested 
various samples, were clearly made in anticipation of litigation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1- 
10; 15-16.) As such, they were testimonial statements under Crawford and Davis and, 
thus, ought not to have been admitted against Mr. Watkins since the State did not 
demonstrate that the lab technician was unavailable, and that the Mr. Watkins had had 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. 
II. 
Dr. Finis' Testimonv Reaardinq Matters She Had Been Told BV Her Assistant And/or 
Her Assistant's Notes Was Inadmissible Hearsay 
Mr. Watkins contends that the DNA expert's testimony regarding how her lab 
technician allegedly handled and tested certain evidence constituted inadmissible 
hearsay under I.R.E. 801 and 802 because it was derived not from personal knowledge, 
but from the out-of-court statements made by the lab technician (in his notes and his 
oral representations over the telephone) which were offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, i.e., that the technician handled the evidence as the DNA expert said 
he handled the evidence. 
Moreover, the out-of-court statements testified to by the DNA expert do not fall 
within any recognized hearsay exception. The lab technician's statements were not 
business records under I.R.E. 803(6) because: (a) some of them were oral and were 
apparently never even recorded; and (b) they were made at the behest of law 
enforcement for use in criminal cases. State v. SandovaCTena, 138 Idaho 908, 91 1- 
112, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058-1059 (2003). Nor were those statements admissible as facts 
or data relied upon by an expert under I.R.E. 703 because the "facts" to which the 
expert testified were not offered pursuant to Rule 703, but rather for their truth. (Indeed, 
they had to be offered for the truth since without that information being admitted against 
Mr. Watkins, the expert's ultimate opinions would have been rendered irrelevant.) 
Because the statements at issue fit the definition of hearsay under I.R.E. 801, 
and because they do not fit within any recognized hearsay exception, they should have 
been excluded under I.R.E. 802. Accordingly, Mr. Watkins respectfully submits that the 
district court erred in allowing the DNA expert to testify as to things told to her by her lab 
technician. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in Mr. Watkins' previous 
briefs, Mr. Watkins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
sentence and remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 18'~ day of July, 2007. 
, ,*." 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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Appendix A - State Court Cases 
Alabama 
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has held that autopsy reports and 
certificates of analysis (showing results of laboratory testing of suspected drugs) are 
nontestimonial business records and, therefore, their admission against criminal 
defendants does not offend the Confrontation Clause. Pruitt v. State, - So. 2d -, 
2006 WL 1793732 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (certificate of analysis); Smith v. State, 
898 So. 2d 907, 916 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2004) (autopsy report)'*; Perkins v. State, 897 
So. 2d 457,464 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2004) (autopsy report). 
It appears that the Alabama Court of Criminal appeals arrived at these holdings 
in a wholly conclusory fashion. See Pruitt, 2006 WL at "4 ("[we conclude that a 
certificate of analysis ... is nontestimonial in nature ...."); Perkins, 897 So. 2d at 464 
("Unlike the hearsay in Crawford v. Washington, the hearsay at issue in this case is 
nontestimonial in nature-an autopsy report on the victim ...."), Smith, 898 So. 2d at 
916 ("Crawford v. Washington ... does not appear to be implicated here because the 
evidence at issue is not testimonial."). However, to the extent that the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals did engage in some sort of analysis before arriving at its holding, it 
seems that the analysis turned on its belief that business records are inherently reliable. 
See Pruitt, 2006 WL at *5 ("Much like an autopsy report, certificates of analysis 
prepared by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences are business records 
grounded in inherently trustworthy and reliable scientific testing, rather than opinionated 
assertions."); Perkins, 897 So. 2d at 464 ("The results of Dr. Embry's autopsy and the 
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supporting materials are business records, which bear the earmark of reliability or 
probability of trustworthiness and further the 'integrity of the fact-finding process' ...").I3 
Arizona 
The Arizona Court of Appeals has held that maintenance and calibration records 
for a breath analysis machine are nontestimonial business records and, therefore, their 
admission does not offend Crawford. Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 185-191, 
129 P.3d 471, 474-480 (Ct. App. 2006). This decision turned on two different, but 
closely related considerations. First, Arizona law requires that maintenance and 
calibration records be created in order to assure the quality of breath analysis 
machines; they are not created by the government in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 
185-187 & n.2, 129 P.3d at 474-476 & n.2. Second, because the records are created 
for quality assurance purposes, they are not created for use against any individual 
defendant, or in any particular case. Id. at 187-190, 129 P.3d at 476-479. 
California 
The relevant published opinions from the California Court of Appeals indicate 
very clearly that the mere fact that a writing constitutes a record created by a business 
or a public official is insufficient to render that writing "nontestimonial" under Crawford. 
In People v. Taulfon, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1224, the Court of Appeals held that a 
" Although it held the autopsy evidence was nontestimonial, the Smith Court nevertheless found a 
Confrontation Clause violation because the cause of death was an essential element of the prosecution's 
case. Smith, 898 So.2d at 916-917. 
'3 It appears that the Pruitt and Perkins Courts considered the perceived reliability of the statements only 
after having conclusorily found them to be nontestimonial and, having thereby disposed of the 
Confrontation Clause issue, moved on to the question of whether the statements were admissible under 
Alabama's hearsay rules. However, because this is not entirely clear from either opinion, it is certainly 
possible that the reliability analysis was actually the rationale underlying "nontestimonial" conclusions. 
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statement is testimonial if "it was obtained for the purpose of potentially using it in a 
criminal trial or determining if a criminal charge should issue." In so holding, the Taulton 
Court noted that, traditionally, business records'are not created to provide evidence. 
See id. at 1224, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 206.14 
A few months later, in People v. Mitchell, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1222-1223, a 
different division of the California Court of Appeals recognized that certain writings 
prepared by the government (or its agents) for use in a criminal case could technically fit 
the definition of "business records" or "public records," but it held that such writings are 
nevertheless testimonial: 
Classification as a "business record" ... does not alone determine whether 
this type of evidence is admissible as non-testimonial under Crawford. In 
Crawford, the Supreme Court noted business records were one example 
of hearsay statements that by their nature were not testimonial. By this 
the Court could not have meant all documentary evidence which could 
broadly qualify in some context as a business record should automatically 
be considered non-testimonial. 
In evaluating the admissibility of business records, courts have 
generally looked to the purpose for which a document was produced. For 
example, in People v. Taulton, the Court of Appeals reasoned a business 
record was not testimonial because "[tjhe purpose of such a writing is to 
prepare a record of an act or event pertaining to a business, not to provide 
evidence." If a record was produced "with an eye toward trial" or 
specifically for use in a criminal prosecution, however, courts have 
generally found the record testimonial. 
Id. (footnote omitted).'= 
l4 In Taulton, the Court of Appeals concluded that prison records relating to the defendant's previous 
incarceration were nontestimonial because they were "not prepared for the purpose of providing evidence 
in criminal trials or for determining whether criminal charges should issue." Taulton, 129 Gal. App. 4th at 
1225. 
15 In Mitchell, the Court of Appeals concluded that a recording of a conversation between a police 
dispatcher and other officers did not, for the most part, implicate the Confrontation Clause because: (a) 
the officers testified and were subject to cross-examination, and (b) the bulk of the taped conversation 
was offered to describe the officer's actions, not to prove the truth of the matters asserted by the officers. 
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It should be noted, however, that there are numerous unpublished decisions from 
the California Court of Appeals which have simply ignored the relevant inquiry as 
articulated by Taulton and Mitchell, and have concluded that the admission of certain 
writings does not implicate the Confrontation Clause. People v. McNeicce, 2006 WL 
2223797 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2006) (citing MifcheN, but failing to acknowledge the 
relevant analysis as set forth therein, and summarily concluding that nothing in the 
autopsy report in question was testimonial); cf, e.g., People v. Hutchins, 147 Cal. App. 
4th 992 (2007) (failing to examine the purpose for which the lab report in question was 
created, even though the appellant argued that report was testimonial because it was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation, and, instead, stating in conclusory fashion (in dicta) 
that the lab report was nontestimonial)." 
Colorado 
In People v. Schreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060-1061 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), the 
Colorado Court of Appeals held that documents evidencing the defendant's prior 
convictions (as well as accompanying affidavits attesting to the authenticity of those 
documents), offered against the defendant in the "habitual criminal" portion of his trial, 
were nontestimonial. The Court of Appeals reasoned first that the documents 
themselves were public records which, because they were analogous to business 
records which were exempted from the Confrontation Clause by the Supreme Court in 
Crawford, were themselves exempted from the Confrontation Clause. Id. The Court of 
Appeals further reasoned that the accompanying affidavits were nontestimonial 
Mitchell, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 1224-1225. With regard to the rest of the tape, the Court concluded that 
any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless. Id. at 1225-1228. 
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because they "were provided solely to verify the chain of custody and authenticity of the 
underlying documentary evidence. It is the underlying documentary evidence, and not 
the authenticating affidavits, that reference (and are thus used to prove) the facts 
material to habitual criminal proceedings, namely, a defendant's prior convictions." Id. 
The following year, in People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2005), cert. granted, 2006 WL 2338141 (Colo. Aug. 14, 2006), the Colorado Court of 
Appeals held that a lab report showing the nature and weight of a controlled substance 
was nontestimonial. Id. at 36-37. In so holding, the Court of Appeals explained that: 
the "majority of jurisdictions hold that laboratory reports and similar documents are 
nontestimonial business or public records;" even if the determination of whether a 
statement is deemed to be "testimonial" turns on whether it was "prepared for the 
purpose of litigation," the defendant failed to "assert, and the record does not show, that 
the report was prepared at the express direction of the prosecutor for the purpose of 
litigation;"" the weighing done by the laboratory was "a routine laboratory procedure;" 
the report was not attested to as a sworn affidavit would be; and the report was not in 
narrative form as an affidavit would be. Id. 
Notably, while the Colorado Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the issue 
of whether lab reports and other documents offered against the accused are 
16 Portions of Hutchins were certified for publication, but not that portion which relates to the Crawford 
issue. The portion relating to the Crawford issue appears to only be available through Westlaw. 
" This contention by the court appears plainly wrong. The Court of Appeals' own opinion reveals that the 
substance in question was seized when the defendant was arrested (for possession with intent to 
distribute), it was suspected of being approximately a kilogram of cocaine, it was sent to a lab to confirm 
its composition and determine its weight, and that defendant's appellate counsel argued that the appellate 
court should "follow a minority of cases that treat as testimonial under Crawford various documents 
prepared at the behest of law enforcement." Id. at 34, 36. 
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"testimonial" under Crawford, it is now poised to do so. On Aug. 14, 2006, in Hinojos- 
Mendoza, it granted certiorari on just this issue and, on May 2, 2007, it heard oral 
arguments. See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 2006 WL 2338141 (Colo. Aug. 14, 2006) 
(unpublished order granting certioraro; Colorado Supreme Court Website (visited 
July 10, 2007) <http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/oraldocW2007/may2007.htm#2~ 
(May 2007 oral argument calendar, including link to audio recording of argument). 
District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that lab reports (regardless of 
whether those lab reports can be considered business records under modern hearsay 
rules) which are procured by the government in conjunction with criminal prosecutions, 
are testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. In Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 
1, 12-15 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006), a case where the government used a chemist's report in 
l~eu of the relevant chemist's live testimony to show that certain substances in the 
defendant's possession were controlled substances, the Court of Appeals held that the 
report was testimonial evidence. In so holding, the Court rejected the government's 
"business records" argument, noting that such an argument "fundamentally misreads 
the Supreme Court's opinion" in Crawford. Id. at 13. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
first that the Crawford Court had explicitly "divorced the Confrontation Clause from the 
rules of hearsay." Id. It next addressed the Crawford Court's mention of business 
records as an example of a hearsay exception which covered statements that are not, 
by their nature, testimonial, explaining that the business records exception that the 
Crawford Court spoke of-that which existed in 2791-"was a very narrow one." Id. 
Indeed, according to the Thomas Court, "[tlraditionally, the historical business records 
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exception did not encompass records prepared for use in litigation, let alone records 
produced ex parte by government agents for later use in criminal prosecutions." Id. 
Thus, the Thomas Court summarized the "testimonial" analysis as follows: 
[Tlhe Supreme Court has defined "testimonial" in functional rather than 
categorical terms. Broadly speaking, the Court has focused in Crawford 
and Davis on the primary anticipated or intended use of the statement, not 
on whether the statement qualifies as an exception to the rule against 
hearsay or falls into some other arbitrary testimonial category. It is true 
that most documents are not testimonial if they qualify as business 
records, because most such documents are created for ordinary business 
purposes unrelated to their potential use by the government in a criminal 
prosecution .... But where a document is created primarily for the 
government to use it as a substitute for live testimony in a criminal 
prosecution, the fact that the document might happen to fall within the 
jurisdiction's business records exception to the hearsay rule does not 
render the document non-testimonial. Accordingly, because DEA 
chemist's reports are created expressly for use in criminal prosecutions as 
a substitute for live testimony against the accused, such reports are 
testimonial, whether or not they happen to meet this jurisdiction's definition 
of a business record. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied upon Thomas and reached a 
similar result with regard to DNA evidence in Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922 
(D.C. Ct. App. 2007). In that case, in attempting to link the defendant to a sex crime 
through DNA analysis, the government offered the testimony of a DNA expert who had 
not actually been present for the testing in question and, in reaching his opinions, had to 
rely on the conclusions reached by the team that actually did the laboratory analysis-a 
serologist, a PCRlSTR technician, and another examiner. Id. at 938. Ultimately, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that: 
Just as Thomas held that reports setting forth the results of analysis of 
drugs by DEA chemists are testimonial because they "are created 
expressly for use in criminal prosecutions," Thomas at 14, so the FBI 
laboratory scientists here were "forensic expert[s] employed by a law 
enforcement agency, ... tasked by the government" to perform tests 
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providing the basis for "critical expert witness testimony ... against the 
appellant at his criminal trial." Id. at 13. To the extent that their 
conclusions were used as substantive evidence against appellant at trial, 
he was therefore entitled to be "confronted with" the conclusions in the 
manner the Sixth Amendment requires, that is, through the opportunity for 
cross-examination of the declarant. 
Roberts, 916 A.2d at 938 
Florida 
The Florida Court of Appeals has consistently held that lab reports and the like 
are testimonial hearsay when prepared for use in a criminal prosecution. In Shiver v. 
Stafe, 900 So. 2d 615, 617-618 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that 
statements made by a non-testifying police officer (as testified to by another police 
officer), which provide information on the performance testing and maintenance of a 
breath test device, are testimonial hearsay within the meaning of Crawford. The Court 
reasoned that such statements are made by the police for the sole purpose of 
establishing the reliability of breath test machines during criminal trials and, thereby, 
getting breath tests results admitted against the accused and, as such, are "statements 
one would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, and [are] made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the 
statements would be available for trial." Id. at 618. 
In Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005), the Court of Appeals held 
that a lab report identifying a substance as a controlled substance was testimonial 
because, regardless of whether it was considered a business record under state law, 
"its purpose is clearly to establish an element of the crime at trial." Id. at 7-8. The 
Johnson Court held that "[tlhe out-of-court statement does not lose its testimonial nature 
merely because it is contained in a business record." Id. at 8. See also Martin v. State, 
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936 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (finding the same type of report to be 
testimonial because again, regardless of whether it is a business record, it was 
prepared for litigation purposes). 
In Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046, 1050-1052 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc), 
the Court of Appeals held that an affidavit by a breath test technician, setting forth what 
the technician observed, the testing procedures she employed, and the results she 
obtained, was testimonial hearsay, regardless of whether the affidavit might be 
considered a public record under Florida law, because the purpose of the affidavit was 
to generate evidence for use at a later criminal trial. See also Williams v. State, 933 So. 
2d 1283, 1284-1285 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (same). 
Finally, in Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006), the Court 
of Appeals followed Johnson and held that blood testing results (as testified to by a 
toxicologist other than the one who had actually done the lab work) were testimonial 
statements because they were procured by the police for use in a criminal case. 
Georaia 
In Rackoff v. State, 637 S.E.2d 706, 709 (Ga. 2006), the Georgia Supreme Court 
held that an inspection certificate for an intoximeter was nontestimonial because it "is a 
record made and promulgated in the regular course of business. It is not made in an 
investigatory or adversarial setting; nor is it generated in anticipation of the prosecution 
of a particular defendant." See also Neal v. State, 635 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006) (holding, in a pre-Rackoff decision, that an inspection certificate is nontestimonial, 
but failing to acknowledge the reasoning later employed by the Supreme Court in 
Rackoff-that the certificate is not prepared for use in a criminal prosecution). 
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Hawaii 
The Hawaii courts, apparently, have not yet thoroughly addressed the question of 
what types of documents, if any, constitute testimonial hearsay when admitted against 
the defendant in a criminal case. However, in an as-yet-unpublished opinion, the Court 
of Appeals held that documents attesting to the testing and calibration, and, by 
implication, the good working order of a breath test machine are nontestimonial. 
State v. Marshall, 2007 WL 1793875, *4-5 (Haw. Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2007) (not yet 
final).I8 The Marshall Court reasoned that the documents at issue were not designed 
primarily to prove some fact for use against the defendant, but simply to ensure the 
accuracy and reliability of the Hawaii's breath testing equipment, and it specifically 
distinguished the facts at hand from those situations where the statements at issue 
were made in response to a law enforcement investigation. Id. at *4. 
The Illinois Court of Appeals has held that a police officer's affidavit regarding the 
testing and maintenance of a breath testing machine is nontestimonial for two reasons: 
first, because "Crawford specifically disclaims any intention to restrict traditional hearsay 
exceptions," and because breath test machine logs are business records (and, thus, fit 
a traditional hearsay exception in Illinois), such affidavits are beyond the scope of 
Crawford; second, such affidavits are not prepared during the course of investigating a 
It is not clear to undersigned counsel whether the Marshall opinion will be published when it becomes 
final. Pursuant to Hawaii Rule of Appellate Procedure 40.l(a), the parties have 90 days to file petitions 
for certiorari to the Hawaii Supreme Court Thus, the earliest date on which the Marshall opinion could 
become final would be September 20, 2007. 
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particular crime and are not prepared for use against a particular defendant. People v. 
Kim, 368, 859 N.E. 2d 92, 93-94 (111. Ct. App. 2006). 
lndiana 
The lndiana Court of Appeals has held that certified documents regarding 
inspection and compliance issues for breath test machines are nontestimonial. Jarrell v. 
State, 852 N.E. 2d 1022, 1025-1026 (Ind. Gt. App. 2006); Rembusch v. State, 836 N.E. 
2d 979, 981-982 (lnd. Ct. App. 2005); Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565, 568-569 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005) [hereinafter, Napier 14; Napier v. State, 820 N.E. 2d 144, 149-1 50 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005) [hereinafter, Napier 4, modified on rehearing by Napier 11. In doing so, it 
has repeatedly found it significant that such documents are not prepared for use in any 
particular criminal case; rather, such documents are prepared in a routine manner, 
regardless of whether any particular breath machine may one day be used in 
connection with a drunk driving investigation andlor prosecution. JarreN, 852 N.E. 2d at 
1025-25; Rembusch, 836 N.E. 2d at 982; Napier 11,827 N.E. 2d at 569. 
Interestingly, it also appears that given an appropriate opportunity, the lndiana 
Court of Appeals would hold that admission of breath test results, unaccompanied by 
testimony from the officer performing the test, would be impermissible because under 
such circumstances there would be an insufficient foundation for the test results. See 
Napier 1, 820 N.E. 2d at 150-51 .I9 
19 This portion of Napier I was withdrawn upon rehearing because, as it turns out, the defendant had 
failed to object to the government's lack of foundation for the breath test results and, in fact, had 
stipulated to the qualifications of the officer administering the test. Napier 11, 827 N.E.2d at 567, 568. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Napier I is still sound. 
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lowa -
The lowa Supreme Court has held that lab reports, created in July of 2000, 
evidencing two positive tests for the HIV virus, were admissible, nontestimonial 
business records when offered by the government in a prosecution for criminal 
transmission of HIV stemming from acts of unprotected sexual intercourse occurring two 
years after the lab reports were created. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 741, 750- 
752, 753-754 (lowa 2006). The Court reasoned, in large part, that since the tests were 
not requested by the police, they were undertaken two years before the crime at issue 
even occurred, and, although it was foreseeable by the lab technicians conducting the 
test that the results might one day be used in a prosecution for criminal transmission of 
HIV, "that use would be rare and certainly collateral to the primary purpose of providing 
the defendant and his medical providers with the information they needed to make 
informed treatment decisions," the lab reports were clearly nontestimonial. Id. at 753- 
754. 
Taking its cues from the lowa Supreme Court's decision in Musser, the lowa 
Court of Appeals recently held that an abstract of a defendant's driving record, created 
for use in building a case against the defendant, was testimonial hearsay whose 
admission violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. State v. Shipley, - N.W. 
2d -, 2007 WL 91 1894, 3 - 6  (lowa Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2007). Notably, the Shipley Court 
implied that the driving records themselves were nontestimoniai and, therefore, would 
have been admissible because they were created in the day-to-day operation of the 
Department of Transportation, not solely for the purpose of litigation. See id. at *6. 
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Kansas 
The Kansas Supreme Court has held that autopsy reports are partially 
testimonial (to the extent that they include "opinions, speculations, and conclusions") 
and partially nontestimonial (to the extent that they contain "factual, routine, descriptive, 
and nonanaiytical findings"). State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kansas 2005).'O In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that numerous opinions from various 
jurisdictions had distinguished "between reports compiled as ordinary business records 
(nontestimonial) and those prepared with the reasonable expectation of use in a 
subsequent prosecution (testimonial)," but it observed that, regardless, "all of the cases 
which specifically address autopsy reports [the Kansas Supreme Court identified four 
such  case^]^' ... have found that autopsy reports are generally nontestimonial under 
Crawford." Id. 348-349, 351. Ultimately, the Kansas Supreme Court followed the four 
autopsy-specific cases (in large part) for two reasons: first, to hold autopsy reports to be 
testimonial would be to impose a great burden on the government, which would have to 
call the pathologist who did the autopsy in every case and, if that pathologist was 
unavailable, might have a hard time prosecuting some homicide cases; and second, 
autopsy reports are reliable: "autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive 
observations of the physical body in an environment where the medical examiner would 
have little incentive to fabricate results." Id. at 351. Thus, the Court labeled those 
20 Lackey was purportedly overruled in part, by State v. Davis, - P.3d -, 2007 WL 925916 (Kan. 2006). 
See Davis, 2007 WL 925916 at *5. However, to the extent that Davis does, in fact, overrule some portion 
of Lackey, the overruling does not appear to relate to the question of whether, and to what extent, 
autopsy reports are testimonial. 
'' The Kansas Supreme Court relied upon Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2004), 
Moreno Denoso v State, 156 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S. 2d 863 
(2005), and Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926 (Md. Ct. App. 2005), all of which are discussed separately 
herein. 
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portions of autopsy reports which it considered most reliable (the "factual, routine, 
descriptive, and nonanalytical findings") nontestimonial, and it labeled those portions 
which it considered less reliable ("contested opinions, speculations, and conciusions") 
testimonial. 
Kentucky 
In Commonwealfh v. Walfher, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006), the Kentucky 
Supreme Court followed the majority rule and held that maintenance and performance 
test records for a breath analysis machine are nontestimonial because, although it is 
foreseeable that they might be used in a criminal prosecution to prove guilt, that is an 
incidental purpose. The Court noted that the primary purpose for creation of such 
records is to ensure that breath test machines are reliable, and any later use against a 
defendant in a criminal case is "incidental." Id. 
In dicta, in an unpublished decision which pre-dated Walther, the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals held that a medical report concerning an examination of an alleged rape 
victim was also nontestimonial. McDonald v. Commonwealfh, 2006 WL 891 110, *3-4 
(Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2006) (unpublished opinion). In that case, the Court of Appeals 
offered two reasons for its holding. First, it concluded that the purpose of the 
examination (and production of the report) was to treat the victim, not generate 
evidence for a criminal case, and, thus, was essentially a routine business record. Id. 
Second, the Kentucky Court of Appeals found persuasive the reasoning of the Kansas 
Supreme Court's decision in Lackey, supra. Id. 
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Louisiana 
In Sfate v. Cunningham, 903 So. 2d 11 10 (La. 2005), the Louisiana Supreme 
Court did not reach the question of whether lab reports documenting chemical analyses 
of suspected controlled substances are testimonial hearsay under Crawford, but it 
seems that it would have so held if it had reached that question. In Cunningham, the 
Court never got to the question of whether the reports were testimonial because it held 
that the defendant had essentially waived his Confrontation Clause claim by failing to 
give notice to the government that he wished to cross-examine the lab technician who 
had tested the substance in question, id. at 11 19-1 122; however, the Court stated that it 
had reached the holding that it did on the waiver issue in order to give the Louisiana 
statute at issue (which required the defendant to give notice if he wished to cross- 
examine the lab technician) a construction which "avoids confrontation problems," 
thereby implying that if it had not found a valid waiver, it would have been constrained to 
find a Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 1120; see also id. at 11 16 (discussing in 
general terms the duty of the Court to employ, whenever possible, a "saving" 
interpretation of a statute whose constitutionality is in doubt). Moreover, the Court 
observed that the government had conceded at oral argument that, had there been no 
waiver, it would have been required to have called the lab technician in order to prove 
its case. Id. at 1121. 
In State v. Anderson, 942 So. 2d 625, 629 (La. Ct. App. 2006), that Court, relying 
partly on the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion in Lackey, supra, held that an autopsy 
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report is nontestimonial because the information contained in an autopsy report is 
"routine, descriptive, and nonanalytica~.~'~~ 
Maryland 
With regard to autopsy reports, the Maryland Court of Appeals has followed the 
lead of the Kansas Supreme Court (see Lackey, supra), and has held that certain 
portions of autopsy reports are testimonial ("contested opinions or conclusions" or 
statements "which are central to the determination of the defendant's guilt"), while other 
portions are not ("findings about the physical condition of the decedent that may be 
fairly characterized as routine, descriptive and not analytical"). Rollins v. State, A.2d 
821, 839-846 (Md. Ct. App. 2006). 
In reaching its holding in Rollins, the Court of Appeals concluded that autopsy 
reports are not per se testimonial for three reasons. First, according to the Rollins 
Court, autopsy reports are not prepared for use in litigation; rather, the express purpose 
of such reports, under Maryland law, is to investigate suspicious deaths.23 Id. at 838- 
839. Second, the Maryland common law (pre-Crawford) supported admission of the 
"factual findings" of an autopsy report even though the defendant could not confront the 
maker of the report. Id. 845. Third, labeling autopsy reports "testimonial" would trigger 
defendants' confrontation rights, which would make some case difficult to prosecute 
22 The Court of Appeals held another autopsy report to be nontestimonial in State v. Leonard, 2006 WL 
3813680, 7 - 9  (La. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished opinion); however, the Court's reasoning is largely 
incomprehensible to undersigned counsel. One thing that is clear in Leonard is that, at least to some 
degree, the Court of Appeals considered significant the fact that autopsy reports are often prepared 
without knowledge of who the defendant might be, thus leading to the inference that part of the Court's 
thinking was that autopsy reports are business records because they are not necessarily prepared for use 
in a particular case. 
23 The implication here, of course, is that if documents are prepared for litigation purposes, they are per 
se testimonial. See Rollins, 897 A.2d at 838-839. 
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(such as where the pathologist who had conducted the autopsy died), and "[tlhis is 
unacceptable" to the Maryland Court of Appeals. Id. 
Having found that autopsy reports are not per se testimonial, the Rollins Court 
also concluded that they are not per se nontestimonial just because they can be 
classified as business I public records. Id. at 835-844. Thus, the Court concluded that 
the individual statements in the autopsy report must be judged individually to determine 
whether they are testimonial or nontestimonial, and it held that "analytical" findings are 
testimonial, while "non-analytical" findings are nontestimonial. Id. at 839-846. 
Massachusetts 
In Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court said that "[olne acknowledged exception to the 
confrontation clause is a public record ...." it then went on to reason that a report of a 
chemical analysis on drugs, because it "merely state[s] the results of a well-recognized 
scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the substance," and is 
"neither discretionary nor based on opinion," is such a public record and, therefore, is 
"well within the public records exception to the confrontation clause." Id. at 705. 
Michiaan 
In People v. Lonsby, 268 Mich. App. 375, 387-393, 707 N.W.2d 610, 617-621 
(Ct. App.), a plurality ~pin ion, '~  the Michigan Court of Appeals found a Confrontation 
Clause violation where the government's serologist read from, summarized, interpreted, 
and speculated from another serologist's written notes. Specifically, it held that, 
24 It is not at all clear why two of the three judges concurred in the result only. See generally Lonsby, 707 
N.W. 2d 610. 
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regardless of whether the notes could come in under some state law-based hearsay 
exception, those written statements were testimonial hearsay (and, thus, their 
admission violated the Confrontation Clause under Crawford) because, as a police 
crime lab scientist performing her analysis and testing for use in a criminal prosecution, 
the serologist's statements "were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that [they] would be available for use at a later 
trial ...." Id. at 391, 707 N.W.2d at 619 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51); see also 
People v. Schell, 2007 WL 284164, * I  (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished 
opinion) (apparently applying Lonsby to find that a fingerprint technician's report was 
testimonial hear~ay).'~ 
In People v. Jambor, 729 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. . App. 2007), a different panel of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals applied a somewhat different analysis than had been 
employed in Lonsby. In Jarnbor, just as in Lonsby, the Court of Appeals set about the 
task of determining whether the documents in question (in Jambor, the documents in 
question were fingerprint cards) were prepared for use in a criminal prosecution, but, in 
Jarnbor, the Court of Appeals only did so in order to determine whether the they were 
business or public records under Michigan's evidentiary rules; this inquiry did not 
directly relate to its Confrontation Clause analysis." Jambor, 729 N.W. 2d at 571-574. 
Having determined that the documents were not prepared for use in a particular criminal 
case and, therefore, were admissible as business records under Michigan law, the 
25 The Michigan Court of Appeals was not entirely clear in Schell as to whether the report was 
inadmissible because of a Confrontation Clause violation or an evidentiary rules violation. See Schell, 
2007 WL 284264, at * I  (describing the defendant's argument in Confrontation Clause terms, but stating 
only the "we agree that the technician's report was inadmissible hearsay" and citing a pre-Crawford case). 
26 The Court of Appeals noted that "[tlhe business records exception is based on the inherent 
trustworthiness of business records. But that trustworthiness is undermined and can no longer be 
presumed when the records are prepared in anticipation of litigation.'' Jambor, 729 N.W. 2d at 572. 
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Court of Appeals held that the statements in those documents were nontestimonial and 
their admission, therefore, did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Jambor, 729 N.W. 
2d at 574-575. This conclusion stemmed from the Court of Appeals' belief that 
Crawford stands for the proposition that business records-as defined by state law-are 
exempt from the Confrontation Clause. 
Minnesota 
in State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006), the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was faced with the question of whether a lab report concerning the composition of 
a suspected controlled substance is "testimoniai" under Crawford. In answering this 
question, the Supreme Court noted that "the critical determinative factor in assessing 
whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation." Id. at 309. 
In its holding, the Court specifically rejected the opinions of three other jurisdictions- 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and North carolina2'-for focusing on the perceived 
reliability of the lab reports at issue in those cases, noting that the United States 
Supreme Court had explicitly rejected such a reliability analysis in Crawford. Id. at 309- 
10. Ultimately, when the Caulfield Court looked at the nature of the lab report at issue 
in that case, it concluded that the report "was clearly prepared for litigation," because 
the suspected controlled substance was seized from the defendant as part of an 
investigation of his suspected drug dealing; it was sent to the lab after it had tested 
presumptively positive for drugs; and it was introduced at trial in order to try to prove 
one of the elements of the charged offense. Id. 
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In State v. Sickmann, 2006 WL 3593042, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished 
opinion), the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed the reasoning of Caulfield and held 
that a document attesting to the qualifications of the nurse who conducted a blood draw 
from the defendant (as part of a DUI investigation) was testimonial hearsay. 
Specifically, the Court rejected the government's contention that document was 
nontestimonial because it was akin to a business record, and concluded that, in fact, it 
was testimonial because it was critical evidence in the government's case and it was of 
such a nature that "one would reasonably expect [it] to be used prosecutorily and be 
available for trial." Id. 
Mississiwwi 
In two pre-Crawford cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the 
admission of lab reports (concerning the chemical testing of suspected controlled 
substances) violated the Confrontation Clause where the lab technician who conducted 
the testing in question did not testify for the government. Kettle v. State, 641 So.2d 746, 
747, 749-750 (Miss. 1994) ("The laboratory report ... was introduced by a person other 
than the one who conducted the tests .... [Tlhe defendant is entitled to have the person 
who conducted the test testify in person."); Barneffe v. Sfate, 481 So.2d 788, 790-791 
(Miss. 1985) ("We hold that it was reversible error to admit, over the objection of 
Barnette, the certificate of analysis into evidence without the testimony of the analyst 
who prepared such."). 
~ ~ ~- ~ 
27 The Minnesota Court of Appeals was referring to Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (2005), 
discussed supra, and State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004), and State v. Cao, 626 S.E. 2d 301 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006), both discussed infra. 
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However, in two later (but still pre-Crawfordj cases, the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court narrowed the Kettle and Barneffe holdings. First, in Adams v. State, 
794 So.2d 1049, 1057-1058 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), the Court of Appeals held that there 
was no Confrontation Clause violation where a lab supervisor testified as to DNA test 
results obtained through another lab technician's work. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that the testifying supervisor had actually participated in the testing, whereas in Kettle, 
the testifying supervisor had not done so. Id. Later, in McGowen v. State, 859 So.2d 
320, 338-340 (Miss. 2003), the Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals' reasoning 
from Adams, holding that a forensic biologist's testimony about certain lab tests 
conducted by another technician did not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation, 
primarily because the testifying biologist was an expert in her own right and had 
participated in the testing by checking the other analyst's worksheets and report. 
Curiously, in what appears to be the only published post-Crawford opinion to 
have addressed the issue of how to deal with documents such as lab reports in the face 
of Confrontation Clause objections, the Court of Appeals has continued to adhere to 
Adams and McGowen, and has apparently ignored Crawford altogether. In Morris v. 
State, 887 So.2d 804, 806-807 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals made no 
mention of Crawford and engaged in no discussion of "testimonial" versus 
"nontestimonial" hearsay in holding that a lab director could testify about to DNA tests 
conducted by another technician without running afoul of the Confrontation   la use.'^ 
The Court of Appeals saw flt to follow Adams, a case where the lab supervisor had had direct 
involvement in the testing at issue, instead of Kettle, a case where the lab supervisor had not been 
directly involved. Morris, 887 So.2d at 806-807. This was an interesting choice given that, in Morris, the 
lab supervisor's connection to the actual testing was remote at best: he trained the technician who did the 
actual testing; he evaluated that technician's proficiency generally; he checked all of the lab's protocols; 
and he signed all reports, including reports prepared by other technicians such as that which was at issue 
in Morris. Id. 
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Missouri 
In State v. March, 216 S.W, 3d 663 (Mo. 2007), the Missouri Supreme Court 
unanimously held that a lab report identifying a substance as cocaine base was 
testimonial hearsay when admitted into evidence in a drug trafficking case without the 
testimony of the crime lab analyst who actually tested the substance. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that Crawford 
carved out a broad exception to the Confrontation Clause for business records, noting, 
as had the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in  horna as, supra, that the business 
record exception which existed in 1791 was narrowly drawn. Id. at 665. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court went on to hold that the operative test for determining whether 
statements are testimonial under Crawford is not whether they are contained in 
documents which might be considered business records under state law, but whether 
they are made for the purpose of prosecuting a criminal defendant. Id. at 666-667. The 
Court held as follows: 
Under the definitions of "testimony" and "testimonial" in Crawfod, as well 
as the "primary purpose" test in Davis, rt is clear that the laboratory report 
in this case constituted a "core" testimonial statement subject to the 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause .... A laboratory report, like this 
one, that was prepared solely for prosecution to prove an element of the 
crime charged is "testimonial" because it bears all the characteristics of an 
ex parte affidavit. 
When a laboratory report is created for the purpose of prosecuting 
a criminal defendant, like this one was, it is testimonial. It may not be 
admitted without the testimony of its preparer unless the witness is 
unavailable and there was a prior opportunity to cross examine. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Notably, the March Court specifically rejected those cases from Colorado 
(Hinojos-Mendoza, supra), Maryland (Rollins, supra), Massachusetts (Verde, supra), 
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and other states which have held laboratory reports to be nontestimonial, observing that 
the courts in those cases had improperly focused on their perception of the reliability of 
the lab reports at issue. March, 216 S.W. 2d at. 665-666 & n.1. As the March Court 
stated, "[tlhe reliability of the reports, once paramount . .. , is now irrelevant" under 
Crawford. Id. 
Montana 
In a pre-Crawford decision, the Montana Supreme Court held the Montana 
Constitution's confrontation clause precluded admission of a crime lab report (regarding 
the composition of a substance suspected of being a controlled substance) where the 
author of the report does not testify. State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 771-772 (Mont. 
1998). Distinguishing Clark, the Supreme Court, in another pre-Crawford decision, later 
held that a document certifying the accuracy of a breath test machine could be used to 
establish a foundation for admission of breath test results at trial. State v. Delaney, 991 
P.2d 461, 464 (Mont. 1999). In Delaney, the Court reasoned that: (a) the certification 
document was not required to be admitted because it was merely used to lay the 
foundation for admission of the breath test results; and (b) as nothing more than 
foundational evidence, the confrontation rights simply are not the same as they would 
be for "substantive" or "accusatory" evidence. Id. at 464. 
Although the above cases pre-dated Crawford, the Montana Supreme Court has 
not changed its approach to confrontation issues after Crawford. In State v. Carter, 114 
P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005), it held that breath test machine certification reports, 
much like the one that was at issue in Delaney, were nontestimonial and, therefore, did 
not give rise to a confrontation right, because they were "not substantive evidence of a 
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particular offense, but rather ... foundational evidence necessary for the admission of 
substantive evidence." In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the defense 
argument that the testimonial versus nontestimonial question turns on the determination 
of whether the documents were created for use at trial, and opted to continue to adhere 
to its pre-Crawford reasoning. Id. at 1007. 
Nebraska 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that a certificate, prepared by a 
representative of a company that supplied a solution used to calibrate and test a breath 
testing machine, providing the composition and concentration of the solution, was 
nontestimonial when offered by the government to establish the reliability of its breath 
testing machine. State v. Fischer, 726 N.W. 2d 176, 182-183 (Neb. 2007). The Court 
reasoned, in part, that the company's certificate was primarily created for the 
administrative purpose of ensuring that the solution was of the proper concentration, 
regardless of any possible future use of that certificate in a criminal prosecution (much 
less some particular case against a particular defendant). Id. at 183. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court applied the logic of Fischer to a slightly different 
scenario a few months later in State v. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2007). In 
Jacobson, the Court held that a certificate of accuracy for tuning forks (which are used 
to calibrate and test a radar gun) was nontestimonial when offered by the government to 
establish the reliability of its radar gun. Id. at 622. The Court reasoned that such 
certificates are prepared routinely in order to ensure accuracy, regardless of whether 
any radar guns may someday be used in criminal cases, and they do not pertain to any 
particular defendant. Id. 
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Nevada 
In City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 207-208 (Nev. 2005), the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that an affidavit, prepared by a nurse and stating the procedures 
followed in conducting a blood test, is testimonial hearsay within the meaning of 
Crawford. In that case, the Court reasoned that although the document may be created 
as part of a standard operating procedure, it is nevertheless created "for use at a later 
trial or legal proceeding" and, thus, its "admission in lieu of live testimony, would violate 
the Confrontation Clause." Walsh, 124 P.3d at 208. 
New Jersey 
The New Jersey courts have held that the operative test for determining whether 
out-of-court statements contained in medical or scientific documents is whether those 
statements were made with an eye toward use in a criminal prosecution. If the 
statements in question are made with an eye toward litigation, they are considered 
testimonial; if they are made for some other routine business or governmental purpose, 
they are considered nontestimonial. 
In State V. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), 
although it did not delve into the precise meaning of "testimonial" under Crawford, the 
Court held that the admission of a lab report providing the results of a blood test could 
not be admitted in lieu of the testimony of the person who actually performed the testing 
without violating the Confrontation Clause. In so holding, the Court rejected the 
government's argument that such a report was a business or government record and, 
therefore, exempt from the Confrontation Clause, because the report at issue was "not a 
record prepared or maintained in the ordinary course of government business; it was 
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prepared specifically in order to prove an element of the crime and offered in lieu of 
producing the qualified individual who actually performed the test." Id. 
In State V. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), the 
Court more explicitly addressed the definition of "testimonial" under Crawford and Davis, 
holding that a certification (from the nurse who conducted a blood draw) as to the 
manner in which the blood sample was taken and handled was undoubtedly testimonial: 
"Here, we have no difficulty in finding the certification to be testimonial .... [Clertainly a 
certification prepared for purposes of trial, and indeed only for purposes of trial, can be 
nothing other than testimonial." In addition, the Court explicitly rejected the 
government's complaint that conferring a Confrontation right in such cases creates an 
undue burden on the State: 
The State's argument that N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-11 should not be construed to 
require the State to produce the nurse who drew the blood because of the 
pragmatic considerations involved in securing such appearance at a trial a 
considerable distance away cannot be squared with the constitutional 
mandate of either Crawford or Berenzansky and must therefore be 
rejected. Unquestionably, those decisions compel the conclusion that 
practical considerations must yield to constitutional imperatives when the 
two collide. 
Id. at 1088. Finally, the Court dismissed the government's contention that defendants 
are not entitled to confront the declarants of out-of-court statements that are minimally 
related to chain of custody issues, noting that the manner in which a blood sample is 
collected and handled may be critical to the outcome of the subsequent scientific testing 
of that sample and, thus, the outcome of the case. Id. at 1088. 
In State v. Kent, 928 A.2d 626, 636-640 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), the 
Court reaffirmed its holdings in Berenzansky and Renshaw, and again found that both a 
nurse's certification as to the manner in which a blood draw was conducted, and a 
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laboratory report showing the results of testing on the blood in question, were 
testimonial hearsay under Crawfordand Davis. 
On the other hand, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court has held that 
documents certifying that a breath test machine was in good working order were 
nontestimonial under Crawford. State v. Dorman, - A.2d -, 2007 WL 1373192, *3 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 11, 2007); see also State v. Godshalk, 885 A.2d 969, 
973 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005) (finding inspection certificates for a breath testing 
machine to be nontestirnonia~).~~ In Dorman, the Court distinguished breath test 
machine certifications from blood draw certificates and lab reports on the basis that 
breath test machine certifications are "not created with any specific case in mind. 
These operability certificates are intended document the regular business function of 
maintaining a particular breathalyzer machine. As such, these documents are properly 
admissible as a business record .. . ." Dorman, 2007 WL at *3. 
New Mexico 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that a blood alcohol report, derived 
from a blood sample taken after the defendant was injured in an automobile accident 
and while the defendant was under suspicion of drunk driving, and prepared by a 
forensic toxicologist employed by the government (albeit not by a police agency) was 
nontestimonial because it was "not investigative or prosecutorial." State v. Dedman, 
29 In Godshalk, one of the first post-Crawford cases in New Jersey, the Law Division of the Superior Court 
seemed to assume that the Crawford Court had created a blanket Confrontation Clause exclusion for 
business records, and it held that because breath testing device inspection reports are business/official 
records under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence (because they are inherently reliable), they are 
necessarily nontestimonial. See Godshalk, 885 A.2d at 973. Notably, the Dorman Court seems to have 
hinted at some flaws in GodshalKs reasoning while approving of its end result: "We approve the holding 
in Godshalk to the extent that it is consistent with the conclusions we reach here." Dorman, 2007 WL at 
*3. 
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102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004). The Court found it significant that the state employee 
who prepared the report was not a police officer and, "[allthough the report [was] 
prepared for trial, the process is routine, non-adversarial, and made to ensure accurate 
measurement." Id. 
New York 
New York's trial courts, whether acting in their appellate capacities or as courts of 
original jurisdiction, appear to have fairly consistently made the 
testimoniallnontestimonial distinction based upon whether the evidence in question was 
prepared for use in litigation. See, e.g., Green v. DeMarco, 11 Misc. 3d 451, 462-465, 
812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 780-783 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County 2005) (holding that a document 
evidencing the testing and calibration of a breath test machine and another document 
evidencing the composition of a solution used to test breath test machines in the field 
were nontestimonial because they were not "made primarily for litigation purposes;" they 
were made to ensure the accuracy of breath testing machines, regardless of whether 
those machines were ever to be used against a defendant in a criminal case);30 
People v. Durio, 7 Misc. 3d 729, 734-736, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 
2005) (holding that an autopsy report was nontestimonial because it "was not 
manufactured for the benefit of the pro~ecution");~' People v. Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d 
30 In Green, a prosecutor was actually raising a collateral attack to a local criminal court's decision in 
People v Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512 (J. Ct. 2005). In Orpin, the court had applied a similar analysis to that 
which was ultimately employed in Green, but it had reached the opposite result, concluding that "[ilt is 
difficult to conceive of any purpose in preparing these documents other than for use in DWI cases." Id, at 
516 - 
31 To a certain degree, the Durio court was also influenced by "the practical implications that would follow 
from treating autopsy reports as inadmissible hearsay in a homicide case," and its concern that such a 
conclusion "would be against society's interests" because it would make convictions more difficult in some 
cases. Durio, 7 Misc.3d at 736-737. 
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788, 789 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005) (holding that a fingerprint report, describing how 
the fingerprints were obtained and forwarded to an analyst for comparison, was 
testimonial because it was not prepared for administrative use, but "with the ultimate 
goal of apprehending and successfully prosecuting a defendant"); People v. Capellan, 
791 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 (Crim. Ct., N.Y. City 2004) (holding that an affidavit, attesting to 
the fact that driver's license suspension order had been properly mailed to the 
defendant, was testimonial hearsay under Crawford, in large part because it "was 
created expressly for use in this litigation"). Cf. People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824, 
826-828 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 2006) (holding that Crawford doe not contain a blanket 
exception for items determined to be "business records" and, therefore, business 
records may constitute testimonial hearsay; further holding, however, that the 
testimoniallnontestimonial distinction turns on the circumstances under which the 
statements in question were originally given, i.e., whether they were given in response 
to structured police questioning, not the reason for which they were given). 
The decisions from New York's intermediate appellate court, the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, are, however, less consistent. On one hand, in People v. Rogers, 
780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396-397 (3d Dept. 2004), the court held that a blood test report 
prepared by a private lab, but requested by and prepared for law enforcement as part of 
a criminal case, was not a business record under New York law (because, having been 
prepared specifically for litigation, it lacked the indicia or reliability typically attendant to 
business records) and, more importantly, constituted testimonial hearsay under 
Crawford (because, having been generated at the request of the prosecution, it was part 
of an effort to generate evidence). On the other hand, in People v. Meekins, 828 
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N.Y.S.2d 83, 84-85 (2d Dept. 2006), the court, relying solely on dicta from Crawford, 
held simply that, "business records are 'by their nature ... not testimonial,"' and, thus, 
held that a DNA report prepared by a private laboratory, even though it was presumably 
created for use at trial, did not implicate Crawford. 
New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, appears to have only addressed 
this issue once. In People v. Pacer, 6 N.Y.3d 504, 509-12, 814 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577-80 
(2006), that court held that an affidavit (describing New York's procedures for notifying 
drivers that their driving privileges have been suspended and stating, upon "information 
and belief' that such procedures had been followed in the case at hand) was testimonial 
because: (a) the affidavit was created at the request of the government with the specific 
intention that it would be used at trial; and (b) the affidavit was "a direct accusation of an 
essential element of the crime . . . ." 
North Carolina 
Even after Crawford, North Carolina's appellate courts have been very lenient in 
allowing the government to introduce out-of-court statements made by lab technicians 
and the like. 
In one line of cases, the Court of Appeals has held that a lab report (or related 
material) prepared by a non-testifying lab technician or expert, which is introduced 
through an expert offering an opinion based upon or consistent with that report, is 
nontestimonial under Crawford because it is not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, but rather to provide the basis of the testifying expert's opinion or to 
corroborate the testifying expert's opinion. See, e.g., State v. Palestino, 2006 WL 
2807035, *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (following Delaney, 
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infra, and Walker, infra; noting that it is well-settled (by state court decisions which 
pre-date Crawford) that an expert may base his or her opinion on tests performed by 
another; and holding that the notes and reports of a lab technician were nontestimonial 
when introduced through the testimony of an expert); State v. Durham, 625 S.E.2d 831, 
834-835 (N.C. Ct. App.2006) (holding that an autopsy report was nontestimonial 
because it was not offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein, but rather to 
demonstrate the basis of the testifying expert's opinion as to the victim's cause of 
death); State v. Lyles, 615 S.E.2d 890, 892-894 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that lab 
reports concerning the testing of suspected controlled substances were nontestimonial 
when offered through a testifying expert because the reports were admitted as the basis 
of the expert's opinions); State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.  2d 699, 700-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005) (same); State v. Waker, 613 S.E. 2d 330, 332-33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding 
that a ballistics report was nontestimonial when offered through a testifying expert 
because the report was admitted as the basis of the testifying expert's opinion and 
because it corroborated the testifying expert's opinion); State v. Jones, 2004 WL 
1964890, *4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion) (same as Lyles and ~ e l a n e ~ ) . ~ *  
Even where the government has not had an expert witness through whom it 
could offer the out-of-court statement, however, the Court of Appeals has allowed some 
of the statement to be introduced. In State V. Cao, 626 S.E. 2d 301, 303-05 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2006), the court held that lab notes and reports concerning the chemical 
composition of suspected controlled substances could be read into the record at trial by 
32 In Lyles and Jones, the government had asserted that the reports were nontestimonial because they 
were business records. In those cases, the Court of Appeals did not go down the "business records" road 
as urged by the government, but instead concluded, sua sponte, that the reports were not offered for the 
truth of the matters asserted therein. Lyles, 615 S.E. 2d at 892-893; Jones, 2004 WL at *2. 
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a lay witness insofar as those notes and reports contain "objective facts" obtained 
through "mechanical means." In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals recognized 
that the notes and report were prepared for trial and, thus, "in some instances, may 
constitute 'testimonial evidence,"' but it also tried to conform its holding to a 1984 (pre- 
Crawford) case in which the North Carolina Supreme Court had held that laboratory 
testing is objective, and that such objectivity minimizes "'the need for and the utility of 
confrontation ...."' Id. at 303-305. Thus, the Court of Appeals held as follows: 
[Llaboratory reports or notes of a laboratory technician prepared for use in 
a criminal prosecution are nontestimonial business records only when the 
testing is mechanical, as with the Breathalyzer test, and the information 
contained in the documents are objective facts not involving opinions or 
conclusions drawn by the analyst. While cross-examination may not be 
necessary for blood alcohol concentrations, the same cannot be said for 
fiber or DNA analysis or ballistics comparisons, for example. 
Id. at 305 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has neither endorsed nor rejected the 
approaches taken by the Court of Appeals; rather, it has simply taken a different 
approach. In Sfafe v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. 2006), that court held that reports 
prepared by a serologist (a special agent) in the state crime lab, concerning his handling 
and analysis of serological samples in a rape case, and introduced through the 
testimony of the special agent's supervisor (who was presumably also an expert), were 
nontestimonial business records because: (a) the reports themselves were "neutral" in 
that they had the power to convict or exonerate the defendant; (b) the reports 
concerned "routine," "ministerial," "nonadversarial" matters; (c) the reports were "not 
inherently subject to manipulation or abuse;" (d) the reports "were not prepared 
exclusively for trial" because, "[a]ithough the record is silent, common experience tells 
us that such reports are prepared for a number of purposes, including statistical 
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analysis and construction of databases;"33 and (e) the special agent "had no interest in 
the outcome of any trial." Id. at 143-144. 
North Dakota 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has expressly declined thus far to determine 
whether a lab report or a similar out-of-court writing is testimonial within the meaning of 
Crawford. In State v. Campbell, 719 N.W. 2d 374 (2006), the issue was raised by two 
co-defendants who had had a lab report (describing the chemical composition of 
suspected controlled substances) admitted against them at trial; however, the Supreme 
Court did not decide the issue, instead concluding that any Confrontation Clause claim 
was waived when the defendants failed to subpoena the author of the report.34 Id. at 
377-378. 
Ohio -
Ohio's appellate courts have not been consistent in their approach to lab reports 
and the like. Numerous decisions have looked to the government's purpose in creating 
the documents at issue, but others have not. 
In State v. Crager, 844 N.E. 2d 390, 396 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2005), the Third 
District of the Court of Appeals held that a DNA analyst's report (as testified to by an 
analyst other than the one who had actually conducted the testing) was testimonial 
hearsay under Crawford. It held that, regardless of whether the report might be 
considered a business record under Ohio's evidentiary rules, it was testimonial because 
33 This conclusion does not appear to have been derived from "common experience" as the court claims. 
but rather a review of the crime labs website. See Forte, 629 S.E. 2d at 144. 
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it "was prepared as part of a police investigation" and because a reasonable person 
would have expected the report to have been used in a subsequent trial. Id. at 396, 
397. The Crager Court also took the time to specifically reject the conclusions of other 
states which have found similar reports to be nontestimonial. See at 396-397, 398 
(rejecting the reasoning of cases such as Dedman, supra, Johnson, supra, Durio, supra, 
Verde, supra, Hinojos-Mendoza, supra, Luginbyhl, infra, and Moreno Denoso, infra). 
In State V. Smith, 2006 WL 846342 (Ohio Ct. App., 3d Dist. Apr. 3, 2006) 
(unpublished opinion), the Third District followed its own reasoning from Crager and 
specifically re-affirmed that decision. In Smith, it held that laboratory reports providing 
the chemical composition of suspected controlled substances were testimonial, and it 
again rejected the reasoning of those cases that have labeled such reports 
"nontestimonial" based on the conclusion that they were business records under state 
law. Id. at *4-5 (again rejecting the reasoning of cases such as Johnson, supra, and 
Dedman, supra, as impermissibly focusing on the perceived reliability of such reports 
despite Crawfords admonishment that reliability is only properly assessed in "the 
crucible of cross-examination"). 
The Fifth and, to a lesser extent, the Sixth Districts of the Ohio Court of Appeals 
have applied similar logic to this issue. In at least three unpublished decisions, they 
have held that documents related to breath test machine testing and calibration were 
nontestimonial, in part because they were not prepared for a specific prosecution. 
Village of Granville v. Graziano, 2007 WL 764765, *3 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Mar. 14, 
2007) (unpublished opinion); Village of Granville v. Easfman, 2006 WL 3423372, *3 
34 Interestingly, Noflh Dakota law provides that if a defendant does subpoena the author of such a report, 
but then chooses not to call him or her at trial, he must pay the witness' costs. Id. at 378 (quoting N.D. 
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(Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Nov. 27, 2006) (unpublished opinion); see also State v. Cook, 
2005 WL 736671, *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 31, 2005) (unpubl~shed opinion) 
(holding breath test machine calibration and testing document non testimonial for two 
reasons: because they were not created for investigation or prosecution purposes, and 
because they are business records under state law). 
In State v. Craig, 853 N.E. 2d 621, 639 (Ohio 2006), however, the Ohio Supreme 
Court seems to have taken a different approach, holding that "autopsy records are 
admissible as nontestimonial business records." It appears that in reaching this holding 
the court believed that there is a blanket exception from the Confrontation Clause for all 
business records.35 See id. 2d at 638-639. 
Finally, in State v. Cosme, 2007 WL 926357, *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. 
Mar. 29, 2007) (unpublished opinion), the Eighth District of the Court of Appeals took 
yet another approach, holding that a DNA analyst's report (as testified to by an analyst 
other than the one who had actually conducted the testing) was not testimonial hearsay 
under Crawford because it was not hearsay at all; the court held that the out-of-court 
statements at issue were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein 
because the testifying analyst "directly review[edIJ' and signed off on the report.36 
~ E N T .  CODE § 19-03.1-37(5)). 
Interestingly, although Graziano and Eastman were decided after Craig, they did not take the 
categorical view that all documents which might be described as business records were necessarily 
nontestimonial. Instead, they apparently adhered to the approach taken by the Third District in Crager 
and Smith. 
36 It is not clear how "directly review[ing]" a report makes one's testimony about that report something 
other than hearsay. Regardless, it is notable that although Cosme was also decided after Craig, the 
Eighth District did not take the categorical view that all documents which might be described as business 
records were necessarily nontestimonial. 
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Oreaon 
Through a series of cases, the Oregon Court of Appeals has ultimately 
concluded that a lab report, which is prepared to assist the government in the 
prosecution of a criminal case, is testimonial hearsay under Crawford. However, the 
Court did not arrive at that holding immediately. 
In the earliest case in the series, State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals expressly declined to reach the question of 
whether a lab report confirming the presence of amphetamine or methamphetamine in 
the defendant's urine is testimonial or nontestimonial; however, it actually hinted that 
such a report is nontestimonial because it "may be analogous to-or arguably even the 
same as-a business or official record, which the Court in Crawford suggested in 
dictum would not be subject to its holding." Id.; see also State v. Forrester, 203 Or. 
App. 151, 156, 125 P.3d 47, 50 (2005) (citing Thackaberry in declining to decide 
whether a lab report concerning a test of the defendant's blood was testimonial or 
nontestimonial). 
In the next case, the Court of Appeals began to refine the requisite analysis. In 
State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15, 18-20 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that 
documents certifying that a breath test machine was accurate were nontestimonial for 
three reasons: (1) the documents are not analogous to an ex parfe examination by a 
government officer, intended to establish facts relevant to a prosecution; (2) the 
technicians who created the documents were not investigating a crime in the traditional 
sense; and (3) the documents are akin to traditional business records. 
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Finally, in State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1057-1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), the 
Court of Appeals had an opportunity to squarely address the issue which had been 
resewed in Thackaberry: "whether lab reports such as those at issue here [one report 
concerned a urinalysis and the other concerned the chemical testing of a white residue 
suspecting of being a controlled substance] are 'testimonial' for purposes of Sixth 
Amendment analysis." The court ultimately held that such reports are, in fact, 
testimonial under Crawford and Davis because: (1) they are analogous to a response 
to questioning by police because they were prepared in response to a police inquiry; 
and (2) they were created for use in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 1058. In reaching this 
holding, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected the above-quoted dicta from its own 
Thackaberry decision and, in the process rejected the notion that Crawford's dicta had 
created a blanket exception to the Confrontation Clause for items that might be 
considered business records under state law: 
[I]t is important to revisit one aspect of our discussion in Thackaberry, in 
which we suggested that "a  laboratory report may be analogous to-or 
arguably even the same as-a business or official record, which the Court 
in Crawford suggested in dictum would not be subject to its holding." 
Thackaberry, 194 Or. App. at 516, 95 P.3d 1142. On reflection, we now 
believe that the Court in Crawford, in suggesting that records under the 
business records exception of the hearsay rule would not be considered 
"testimonial." did not have in mind the type of record at issue here, viz., a 
lab report prepared for use against a criminal defendant in a specific 
criminal prosecution. That is so because such a record did not fit the 
common-law exception for business records that would have been familiar 
to the framers of the Sixth Amendment. 
Miller, 208 Or. App. at 436, 144 P.3d at1058 (emphasis added).37 
37 The Supreme Court's Davis decision was apparently critical in causing the Court of Appeals to look 
more deeply into the Crawford Court's brief mention of "business records" and, ultimately, causing the 
Court of Appeals to reconsider its view that lab reports and the like, because they might be considered 
"business records" under modern state evidentiary rules, are nontestimonial under Crawford. See id. at 
435, 144 P.3d at 1058 (noting that its decision was made "in the light of the [Supreme] Court's recent 
decision elaborating on Crawford," obviously referring to Davis, and focusing heavily on the Supreme 
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Pennsylvania 
Strangely, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate courts have simply ignored 
Crawford when evaluating Confrontation Clause challenges to the government's use of 
lab reports and the like. In Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A.2d 957, 960 (Pa Super. Ct. 
2004) (en bane), a post-conviction case, the petitioner argued that he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case because his appellate 
counsel had failed to argue that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
had been violated when, at trial, the government was allowed to offer a lab report 
relating to the chemical testing of a suspected controlled substance, even though that 
argument had been preserved by trial counsel. Ultimately, the Superior Court held that 
the petitioner's trial counsel had, in fact, been ineffective for failing to make that 
argument. Carter, 861 A.2d at 970. The interesting thing about Carter though is that 
the Superior Court did not rely upon, or even acknowledge the existence of, Crawford, 
and it instead applied Pennsylvania's pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause analysis. 
Court's admonition that statements are testimonial "where the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution" (quoting Davis)). 
In digging deeper into what the Crawford Court meant with its reference to "business records," the 
Court of Appeals saw fit to examine in great detail what the term "business records" actually meant to the 
Framers of the Constitution and, therefore, what it must have meant to the Crawford Court. See id. at 
1058-60 (disclosing that the origin of the modern hearsay exception for business records is derived from 
the common law "shop book rule," discussing the history and scope of the shop book rule, and concluding 
that the shop book rule clearly did not cover records created for use in litigation). Ultimately, the Court of 
Appeals concluded as follows: 
In light of the scope of the common law shop book rule as described above, we conclude 
that a lab report that is prepared by staff at a state crime laboratory at the request of 
police for use in a criminal prosecution of a specific defendant would not fall within the 
shop book rule exception as the framers of the United States Constitution would have 
understood it. Indeed, it would not even fall within the expanded version of the rule 
enacted by Congress in 1936 and interpreted by the Court in Palmer [v. Hoffman, 318 
U.S. 109 (1943)], because its primary utility is in litigating not in the day-to-day running of 
a crime lab .... In sum, and contrary to our suggestion in Thackaberry, the lab reports 
here are not the sort of "business records" referred to in the Crawford dictum. 
Id. at 438-439, 144 P.3d at 1060. 
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Apparently, this analysis required the court to determine first whether the evidence at 
issue was inadmissible under the Commonwealth's hearsay rules and, only i f  the 
evidence was determined to be inadmissible hearsay, go on to decide whether the 
defendant's confrontation rights were infringed such that the error in admitting the 
hearsay was not harmless. See id. at 963-964. Having found that the lab reports did 
not fit the business records exception to Pennsylvania's hearsay rule (because they 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation), the Superior Court relied upon a series of 
pre-Crawford cases from Pennsylvania and elsewhere to hold that the error in admitting 
them was not harmless because the petitioner's confrontation rights were violated 
because: (1) the witness who essentially read the lab report into the record was not 
proffered as an expert; (2) that witness, even had he been an expert, offered no 
opinions of his own and merely repeated information contained in the report; (3) that 
witness did not have a "close connection" to the laboratory testing underlying the report; 
and (4) the lab report was the only evidence available to establish a critical element of 
the offense.38 Id. at 962-970. 
While Carter might have otherwise been explained by the fact that that case was 
decided a mere 7% months after the United States Supreme Court handed down the 
Crawford decision, such an explanation must fail when one considers that the Superior 
Court continues to ignore Crawford and rely upon Carter in evaluating Confrontation 
Clause claims related to the government's use of lab reports. For example, in 
38 Notably, even the dissent in Carter failed to recognize or apply Crawford, as it focused on its perception 
of the reliability of the lab report; it argued that "no confrontation problems are raised in this case since 
the lab report was admitted under a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule and supported by 
sufficient indicia of reliability;" and it argued that "even the fundamental constitutional right of confrontation 
must bow to considerations of public policy and the necessities of a case where the utility of confrontation 
is, as it is here, remote "Id. at 971, 973 (Joyce, J., dissenting). 
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Commonwealth v. Twitty, 876 A.2d 433, 436-438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), a case which 
was decided well over a year after Crawford, the Superior Court followed Carter in 
evaluating the defendant's Confrontation Clause claim, this time finding a DNA report to 
be inadmissible hearsay (it was not a business record because it was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation), but also finding the error in admitting that report was harmless 
when the facts of the case were applied to the four considerations articulated in Carter: 
(1) the witness who testified about the report was an expert; (2) the witness' testimony, 
including his opinions, was his own; (3) the witness was connected to the preparation of 
the report; and (4) the subject of the report was not the sole evidence connecting the 
defendant to the crime. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 669-670 
(Pa Super. Ct. 2007), a case decided just this year, the Superior Court held that the 
defendant's Confrontation Clause argument was without merit where a forensic 
neuropathology report and an autopsy report had been admitted against him. Although 
the Superior Court concluded that the reports were clearly inadmissible hearsay, it 
found that the error in their admission was harmless because the defendant's 
confrontation rights were not infringed because: (1) the witness who testified about the 
reports was an expert; (2) the witness' testimony was based on his own knowledge; (3) 
the witness was connected to both reports; and (4) the witness did not disagree with the 
primary defense theory. Bruce, 916 A.2d at 666-670. 
South Carolina 
In State v. Cutro, 618 S.E. 2d 890, 895-896 (S.C. 2005), the South Carolina 
Supreme Court took Crawford's dictum literally, holding that, as a bright line rule, 
documents which constitute business or official records under state law are exempt 
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from confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. It ultimately held that since an autopsy 
report fits certain hearsay exceptions for official records under the South Carolina Rules 
of Evidence, such reports may be admitted against a criminal defendant without 
implicating the Confrontation Clause. Id. 
Tennessee 
In a pre-Crawford decision, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that 
admission of DNA test results through the testimony of someone other than the 
technician who actually conducted the testing did not constitute a Confrontation Clause 
violation because the technician's out-of-court statements were considered "inherently 
reliable" under Tennessee's evidentiary rules. State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W. 3d 58, 66-67 
(Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1999). Notably, however, the court was concerned with those 
Tennessee Rules of Evidence, which govern admission of expert opinions and the 
bases for those opinions, and the court specifically noted that the lab report at issue 
could not be admitted as a business record because it was prepared for use in litigation 
against the defendant. Id. at 67 n.8. 
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has revisited this issue, although apparently not 
yet in a published decision. In State v. Lewis, 2006 WL 684590, *lo-12 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. 
App. Mar. 15, 2006) (unpublished opinion), a case with facts strikingly similar to those in 
Kennedy, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Crawford fundamentally altered 
the Confrontation Clause standard that had been applied in Kennedy and it 
acknowledged that now the key question in cases where the government seeks to use 
lab reports and the like against the defendant is whether those reports are "testimonial" 
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in nature. It then determined, in a wholly conclusory fashion, that the DNA report at 
issue in Lewis was nontestimonial. Id. at * I2  (noting that Crawford held that if an out-of- 
court statement is nontestimonial, the old "reliability" standard of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980), applies and, "[tlhus, the admissibility of the nontestimonial hearsay of 
Dr. Melton is still subject to the standard set forth in Ohio v. R~be r t s " ) . ~~  
More recently, in State v. Warlick, 2007 WL 1439648 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. May 
17, 2007) (unpublished opinion), the Court of Criminal Appeals engaged in a slightly 
more thorough "testimonial" analysis. In that case, the court noted that "[tlhere is no 
dispute that the [defendant's] medical records in this [drunk driving] case are 
nontestimonial" for two reasons: first, they are business records, which the Crawford 
Court excluded from its definition of "testimonial;" second, the records were not created 
for the purpose of prosecuting the defendant, but to provide her with medical 
treatment4' Id. at *6. 
Texas 
The Texas courts have consistently held that autopsy reports are nontestimonial 
under Crawford. In Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), the 
Court of Appeals held that an autopsy report, admitted into evidence despite the fact 
that the pathologist who had conducted the autopsy had since passed away, was 
nontestimonial and, therefore, properly admitted, because the report was neither prior 
testimony nor a statement given in response to a police interrogation. The Denoso 
39 Notably, while analyzing the question of whether the lab report was admissible under the Tennessee 
Rules of Evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeals again expressed its belief that such lab reports cannot 
be considered business records because they are prepared for litigation. Id. at *I3 n.3. 
40 Under this reasoning, the DNA report in Lewis should have been found to have been testimonial. Thus, 
it appears that the Tennessee authorities are in conflict. 
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Court also held that autopsy reports are public and business records under Texas' rules 
of evidence; however, that holding appears not to have factored into the court's 
Confrontation Clause analysis. See Denoso, 156 S.W.3d at 180-181. Less than a year 
after Denoso was decided, the Court of Appeals once again held that an autopsy report 
(again, admitted into evidence without any testimony from the pathologist who actually 
conducted the autopsy) was nontestimonial. Mifchell v. State, 191 S.W.3d 219, 221- 
222 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). In doing so, the Court of Appeals again reasoned that 
autopsy reports are neither prior testimony nor statements given in response to police 
interrogations, but, this time, it further reasoned that since autopsy reports are business 
records under Texas law, they are categorically exempt from the Confrontation Clause. 
Id. See also Terrazas v. Sfafe, 2006 WL 2080381 (Tex. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2006) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that the court need not even reach the 
testimoniallnontestimonial distinction where one of the signatories of the report testifies 
against the defendant at trial (even though the witness did not actually perform the 
autopsy and, indeed, may not have had any role in preparing the report other than 
affixing his signature to it)). 
The Texas courts have been far less consistent in another area-the use of 
disciplinary reports against a defendant during the penalty phase of a criminal case. In 
Russeau v. Sfafe, 171 S.W.3d 871, 880-881 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2005), the earliest of 
these cases in the post-Crawford era, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that 
disciplinary reports which documented "in the most detailed and graphic of terms, 
numerous and repeated disciplinary offenses on the part of the appellant [defendant] 
while he was incarcerated," were testimonial under Crawford; it held that they 
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"amounted to unsworn, ex parte affidavits of government employees and were the very 
type of evidence the [Confrontation] Clause was intended to prohibit." However, less 
than six months later, in Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 208-209 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) 
the Court of Appeals held that jail disciplinary reports were nontestimonial because, 
unlike the graphic, detailed reports in Russeau, the reports at issue in Ford were 
nothing more than "sterile recitations of appellant's offenses and the punishments he 
received for those offenses." Id. at 209. Cf. Henderson v. State, 2006 WL 179596, *6 
(Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that the defendant's trial 
counsel did not render ineffective assistance when, during the defendant's sentencing 
proceeding, counsel failed to object to admission of a "prison packet," identifying the 
defendant's prior felony convictions, because the packet was not inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause, apparently because the packet was more akin to the "sterile" 
documents in Ford than the graphic, detailed documents in Russeau). 
Most recently, the Court of Appeals held that admission of portions of a 
defendant's high school disciplinary records during the penalty phase of his case 
constituted a Confrontation Clause violation. Grant v. State, 218 S.W.3d 225, 230-232 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007). In reaching that holding, the Court of Appeals did not analogize 
the facts at hand to those of either Russeau or Ford, as numerous prior decisions had 
done;4' rather, it simply observed that the disciplinary records "fall[ ] somewhere 
between the graphic and detailed testimonial statements described in Russeau and the 
sterile recitations of fact quoted in Ford." Id. at 232. It then went on to "clarify" the 
Russeau and Ford decisions, asserting that those cases had not turned on the level of 
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detail in the statements at issue in each, so much as the degree to which those 
statements were subjective and were related to the defendant's guilt or innocence:42 
[Tlhe distinction between the admissible statements quoted in Ford and 
the inadmissible statements described in Russeau is not simply the 
inclusion or omission of "detailed and graphic" personal observat/ons ..... 
Rather, in Ford, we conceptualized the difference between testimonial and 
non-testimonial statements as dependent in part on the extent to which 
the statements are a sterile recitation of facts or a subjective narration of 
events related to the appellant's guilt or innocence. In Ford, the 
statements in the disciplinary reports were objective statements ...; they 
were not narratives by witnesses against the appellant relating to his guilt 
or innocence of the infractions described. Consequently, the statements 
were non-testimonial.. . . In contrast, the statements in Russeau contained 
subjective narrations of the very actions by the appellant that constituted 
the offenses for which he was punished. Thus, the presence or absence 
of a subjective narration of events related to the appellant's guilt or 
innocence is a significant difference between the statements at issue in 
Russeau and ~ o r d . ~ ~  
Id. at 230-31. This "clarification" was obviously an attempt to reconcile the Texas 
courts' previous interpretations of Crawford with the United States Supreme Court's 
then-recent Davis decision, wherein the Court had made it clear that a testimonial 
statement is one which is intended to establish or prove some fact(s) potentially relevant 
to a later criminal prosecution. See Grant, 218 S.W.3d at 231-232 (quoting Davis and 
discussing the meaning of "testimonial" in light of both Davis and Crawford), 
Given its "clarification" of Russeau and Ford. the Grant court concluded that the 
school disciplinary records consisted primarily of testimonial hearsay because "the 
42 See, e.g., Nieschwietz v. State, 2006 WL 1684739, *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 2006) (unpublished 
opinion); In the Matter of J.R.L.G., 2006 WL 1098944, "2 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2006) (unpublished 
o inion). Cf, e.g., Henderson, 2006 WL 179596 at *6. 
4pWhen the Court of Appeals speaks of guilt or innocence in this context, it is not referring to the crime 
charged, but rather whatever conduct is being offered as an aggravating fact by the government at 
sentencing. 
43 Apparently, in Texas, prior convictions and prior bad acts generally are considered not to assess the 
defendant's potential for rehabilitation or the degree to which he presents an ongoing threat to society, or 
to punish him as a recidivist, but rather to punish him again for his past actions, which may have already 
been adjudicated and punished, or which may have never actually been adjudicated. 
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descriptions of appellant's behavior and quotations of language he used are not 
intended merely to establish that appellant committed a disciplinary infraction, but to 
establish that he violated school rules by engaging in the specific behavior described." 
Id. at 232. 
It should be noted that in a handful of unpublished pre-Davis and pre-Grant 
decisions, the Texas courts have held that, for a variety of reasons, various classes of 
documents which might be offered against the accused are nontestimonial and, thus, do 
not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 2006 WL 1738288, 
*3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that reports detailing the 
physical examination of the victim and showing DNA test results are nontestimonial 
because: the reports are neither prior testimony nor the result of an interrogation; they 
relate to physical evidence collected during the investigation of a crime; they set forth 
observations made pursuant to a duty imposed by law; and they do not accuse the 
defendant of ~ rongdo ing) ;~~ Nieschwietz v. State, 2006 WL 1684739, *6 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Jun. 21, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (adhering to Denoso and Ford and holding that a 
vehicle registration is nontestimonial because it is a business record under Texas law 
and because it conveys "objective and historical information," as opposed to "subjective 
observations"); In the Matter of J.R.L.G., 2006 WL 1098944, *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 
2006) (unpublished opinion) (analogizing the facts at hand to those of Ford and holding 
that lab reports providing the results of a urinalysis are nontestimonial because: they 
"merely contain the results of the tests;" they do not consist of prior testimony or 
statements made in response to a police interrogation; and they are akin to business 
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records);45 Eslora v. State, 2005 WL 763233, *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2005) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that the defendant's medical records are nontestimonial 
because they are business records under Texas law). However, as noted above, these 
cases are of questionable authority, not only because they are unpublished and, 
therefore, not binding even in Texas, but primarily because they pre-date Davis and the 
Texas courts' subsequent recognition that the key inquiry in determining whether a 
statement is "testimonial" is the purpose for which the statement was made. 
Virainia 
In 2004, the Virginia Supreme Court stated in dicta that a pawn shop journal is 
nontestimonial because it is a business record and business records were specifically 
exempted from the Confrontation Clause in C r a ~ f o r d . ~ ~  Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 
601 S.E.2d 555,570 (Va. 2004). 
Less than a year after Riner was decided, the Virginia Court of Appeals was 
asked to determine whether a breath test certificate, i.e., an affidavit, stating the 
defendant's blood alcohol content, as determined through a breath test, and attesting to 
the breath test machine's good working order, the manner in which the test was 
conducted, and the operator's certification to use a breath test machine, was 
testimonial. See generally Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 618 S.E.2d 347 (Va. 2005) 
44 Johnson is unique among Texas cases for explicitly rejecting the argument that Crawford's dicta 
supports the notion that document which can be classified as business records under state law are 
necessarily exempt from Confrontation Clause challenges. Johnson, 2006 WL 1738288 at *3 n.4. 
45 Interestingly, although In the Matter of J.R.L.G. involved probation revocation proceedings, not a trial, 
the Court of Appeals chose to evaluate the defendant's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clause, not the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See generally In the Matter 
of J.R.L.G., 2006 WL 1098944. 
46 The appellant never raised the Confrontation issue in Riner and, in fact conceded that "Crawford has 
no bearing on whether the trial court properly admitted the pawn shop journal because, as a business 
record, it was not 'testimoniar hearsay.'' Riner, 601 S.E.2d at 570. 
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(hereinafter Luginbyhl I). Although the Court of Appeals initially held that the certificate 
was not testimonial because it did not consist of prior testimony and was not the product 
of a police interrogation, and because it contained "neutral" statements which did not 
accuse the defendant of wrongdoing, Luginbyhl 1, 618 S.E.2d at 354-55, that case was 
ultimately reheard and, upon rehearing, the Court of Appeals did not reach the question 
of whether the certificate was testimonial. Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 77- 
78 (Va. 2006) (en banc) (hereinafter Luginbyhl Thus, neither Luginbyhl 1 nor 
Luginbyhl I1 is useful in defining "testimonial." 
Nevertheless, one of Virginia's trial courts relied fairly heavily upon Luginbyhl I in 
ruling that a "certificate of analysis," a report summarizing a chemical analysis of 
suspected narcotics, was nontestimonial. Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 Va. Cir. 277 
(2005) (also available through Westlaw at 2005 WL 3007781, *2-4)." The court 
reasoned that certificates of analysis do not "bear testimony" and are not accusatory in 
nature because they are "routine," nondiscretionary, and "state the results of a well 
recognized scientific test." Williams, 2005 WL 3007781 at *3. 
In early 2006, the Court of Appeals again weighed in on the question of whether 
certain writings can constitute testimonial hearsay. In Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 
Va. App. 461, 465-71, 624 S.E.2d 675, 677-80 (2006), it held that a certified document 
from the Delaware Secretary of State, attesting to the absence of an official record, was 
nontestimonial. The Court of Appeals based this holding on two reasons: first, the 
" Notably, in both Luginbyhl I and Luginbyhl 11, one judge dissented, arguing that the definition of 
"testimonial" surely includes formal statements prepared by a government agent for litigation and used in 
lieu of live testimony, and that the majority's neutral/accusatory distinction is untenable because it is really 
nothing more than a repackaged "reliability" test like the one that had explicitly been rejected in Crawford. 
Luginbyhl 1, 618 S.E.2d at 357-60 (Eknton, J., dissenting); Luginbyhl 11, 628 S.E.2d at 79-82 (Benton, J., 
dissenting). 
4a Luginbyhl /I had not yet been published when Williams was decided. 
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Secretary of State is neutral and its statements are objective and, thus, its certification is 
not accusatory and does not describe any wrongdoing on the part of the defendant; 
second, although the certification was prepared at the request of law enforcement, "the 
reports were prepared in a non-adversarial setting in which 'the factors likely to cloud 
the perception of an official engaged in the more traditional law enforcement functions 
of observation and investigation of crime are simply not present."' Id. at 469-70, 624 
S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Dedman, supra, 102 P.3d at 635). 
Just a few months after issuing its Michels opinion, the Court of Appeals issued 
an unpublished opinion in Commonwealth v. Brown, 2006 WL 1068989, *2-3 (Va. 
Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2006) (unpublished opinion), holding that a report prepared by a 
sexual assault nurse examiner, summarizing the nurse examiner's actions and her 
observations of the victim, was nontestimonial. The Court of Appeals relied heavily 
upon its then-recent Michels opinion and concluded that the report was not accusatory, 
and that the information contained in the report was obtained in a non-adversarial 
Washinaton 
While one division of the Washington Court of Appeals has attached the label of 
"nontestimonial" to an affidavit attesting to the fact that a search for records of a driver's 
49 Notably, in discussing this "non-adversarial setting," the Court of Appeals analogized the case at hand 
to one involving laboratory reports: 
[T]he treatment accorded laboratory results under Crawford. Laboratory results which 
"state the results of a well-recognized scientific test," have been classified as non- 
testimonial in other jurisdictions. Such reports are "neither discretionary nor based on 
opinion." Critically, such laboratory reports do not involve statements to the police or 
other government agents acting in their stead, which accuse another person of a crime. 
Such reports are, moreover, not prepared in an adversarial setting. 
Brown, 2006 WL 1068989 at '2 (citations omitted). 
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llcense for the defendant came up empty, State v. N.M.K., 163-164, 118 P.3d 268, 372- 
373 (Wash Ct. App. 2005), another division of the same Court has similarly found 
1 nontestimonial an affidavit attesting to the status of the defendant's driving privileges 
I 
generally, State v. Kronich, 546-547, 128 P.3d 119, 122-123 (Wash Ct. App. 2006). In 
both cases, the respective courts applied a blanket rule to the effect that documents 
which are appropriately considered business or public records under Washington's 
evidentiary rules are necessarily nontestimonial based upon certain dicta appearing in 
Crawford. Kronich, 131 Wash. App. at 122-23, 128 P.3d at 546; N.M.K., 129 Wash 
App. at 163, 118 P.3d at 372. However, both cases are of questionable authority since 
the Washington Supreme Court has granted review in both. State v. Kronich, 139 P.3d 
349, 349 (2006); State v. Kirkpatrick, 136 P.3d 758, 758 (Wash. 2006). 
Also of questionable authority is State v. Hawkins, 2007 WL 61874 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Jan. 9, 2007) (unpublished opinion). In that case, although the Court of Appeals 
did not reach the issue of whether a crime lab report is testimonial under Crawford, it did 
note that the government had conceded that the report was, in f ~ c t ,  testimonial 
"because the report was always intended for use at trial." Id. at *2-3. 
Wisconsin 
In 2002, in a pre-Crawford case, State v. Williams, 644 N.W.2d 919, 924-927 
(Wash. 2002), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a lab supervisor, familiar with the 
testing procedures at hand, qualified as an expert in his own right, and rendering his 
own opinions, could testify about tests conducted by a non-testifying analyst under his 
direct supervision without running afoul of the Confrontation Clause. The Court went on 
to hold, however, that the analyst's actual report was inadmissible hearsay because, as 
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a document created by and for the government for litigation purposes, it was not a 
business record under Wisconsin's rules of evidence. Id. at 928-931. 
In the post-Crawford era, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has revisited the 
Confrontation Clause analysis that was undertaken in Williams. In State v. Barton, 709 
N.W.2d 93, 95-97 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005), the Court of Appeals adhered to Williams, 
holding that a crime lab supervisor could offer his own opinions based on a test 
conducted by an analyst under his supervision. The Court of Appeals went on to say 
that Crawford had no impact on the continued vitality of Williams. Id. at 214-216, 97-98. 
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Appendix B - Federal Court Cases 
Second Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that autopsy reports are 
nontestimonial because they are both business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(6) and public records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) and, as such, they are 
necessarily nontestimonial. United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233-237 (2d Cir. 
2006). This holding did not turn solely upon the "superficial[ly] appeal[ingln argument 
that the Crawford Court stated in dicta that "[mlost of the hearsay exceptions covered 
statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records ...," 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56; rather, it was based on the critical observation that 
documents prepared in anticipation of litigation do fall within the Federal Rules' 
definition of business or public records and, thus, business and public records tend not 
to carry the risk that they will be improperly manipulated by the prosecution. Feliz, 467 
F.3d at 234, 237. 
Third Circuit 
In United States v. Rahamin, 168 Fed. Appx. 512, 520 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished opinion), in dicta, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit opined that a 
lab report concerning the chemical composition and weight of a suspected controlled 
substance constituted testimonial hearsay, the admission of which was a Confrontation 
Clause violation. 
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Fourth Circuit 
In United States v. Mendoza-Orellana, 133 Fed. Appx. 68, 70 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(unpublished opinion), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an affidavit 
certifying to the nonexistence of an immigration record was nontestimonial because it 
was public record under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Unfortunately, the Court of 
Appeals did not explain its reasoning except to cite United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 
F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005), which is discussed infra. See Mendoza-Orellana, 133 Fed. 
Appx. at 70. 
Fifth Circuit 
In Rueda-Rivera, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an affidavit 
certifying to the nonexistence of an immigration record was nontestimonial because it 
was public record. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680. The Court relied primarily upon 
dicta in Crawford asserting that business records, by their nature, are nontestimonial. 
Id. 
Seventh Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that the defendant's 
medical records, ~ncluding lab reports showing that the defendant's urine tested positive 
for methamphetamine, were nontestimonial even though they were obtained as part of a 
criminal investigation. Unifed States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925-927 (7th Cir. 2006). In 
so holding, the Court of Appeals recognized that even its own precedent supported the 
argument that the records were testimonial because they were created with "an eye 
towards criminal prosecution," but it nevertheless held that because the records were 
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also created in the normal course of the hospital and the labs' business, they were 
business records and, according to dicta in Crawford, as business records, they were 
necessarily nontestimonial. Id. at 924-927. 
In Ellis, the Court of Appeals further held that a certificate, i.e., affidavit, attesting 
to the authenticity of the aforementioned medical records was nontestimonial. Id. at 
927. The Court reasoned that although this record was also prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, because the medical records themselves were nontestimonial in the court's 
view, "it would be odd to hold that the foundational evidence authenticating the records" 
was testimonial. Id. The Court also found it significant that the certificate was not used 
as substantive evidence against the defendant. Id. 
Ninth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, consistent with those of the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits, has held that an affidavit certifying to the nonexistence of an 
immigration record was nontestimonial. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 
825, 832-834 ( Q ' ~  cir. 2005). The Court seems to have offered three reasons for its 
conclusion: first, the affidavit "closely resembles" a business record; second, although 
the affidavit was prepared for litigation, the records which it addresses were not; and 
third, the affidavit does not resemble live, out-of-court questioning by the police. Id. 
Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit has held that a warrant of deportation, when used by the 
government in a subsequent prosecution to prove that the defendant, an alien, had 
illegally re-entered the United States, is nontestimonial under Crawford. United 
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States v. Salina-Valenciano, 220 Fed. Appx. 879, 882-883 (20th Cir. 2007) (unpublished 
opinion). In reaching its holding, the Court noted as follows: "The key question under 
Crawford is whether the document sought to be introduced was prepared for the 
purpose of litigation, or whether it was prepared for regulatory, business, or other 
purposes apart from the possibility of its use as evidence in a legal proceeding." Id. at 
882. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the warrant of deportation was nontestimonial 
because "its primary purpose is to enable immigration authorities to keep track of who 
has been deported and when," and as such, it "was not prepared in contemplation of 
litigation . . . ." Id. at 882-883. 
Applying the same standard to an affidavit certifying to the nonexistence of an 
immigration record, the Salina-Valenciano Court stated5' that that document was 
testimonial. Id. at 883-885. The Court based this conclusion on the fact that such 
documents are "prepared specifically in contemplation of litigation. Indeed, the sole 
purpose of a CNR [Certificate of Non-existence of Record] is to provide the proof 
necessary in a prosecution under 8 U.S.C. 5 1836 that the defendant was not given 
permission to reenter the country. It has no other use." Id. at 883. 
Armed Forces 
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has held that service record 
entries detailing the defendant's desertion, i.e., "personnel documents that chronicle the 
50 The Tenth Circuit's conclusion probably cannot be considered a holding because the Court 
acknowledged some uncertainty about its decision and, in fact, stated that it was not deciding the issue, 
but rather ruling for the defendant because the government had failed to offer any cogent argument 
against finding the certificate to be testimonial. Id. at 883, 884-885. On the other hand, the Tenth 
Circuit's conclusion probably cannot be dismissed as mere dicta either since the government was not so 
much procedurally defaulted, as it lost for having failed to convince the Court of Appeals that the 
defendant's argument was wrong. See id. at 883-886. In other words, it appears that the Tenth Circuit 
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relevant dates, times, and locations of the [defendant's] whereabouts," were 
nontestimonial documents. United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 553-55 (N-M.C. 
Ct. Crim. App. 2006). The Court reasoned that the personnel documents at issue were 
nontestimonial because they were not prepared by law enforcement personnel or any 
prosecuting agency, and because they are routinely created, not for use in court-martial 
proceedings, but to serve a host of administrative functions. Id. at 554. The Court also 
reasoned that the information contained within the personnel documents was "objective 
in nature: dates, times, places, and identifying data." Id. 
A few months after Rankin was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces affirmed Rankin's focus on the purpose for which the document in question was 
created. In United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2006), that Court 
observed as follows: 
[Tlhe application of Crawford not only depends on the meaning of 
"testimonial," but on the circumstances and context in which out-of-court 
statements are generated, and whether the out-of-court statements were 
made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial by the government. 
Thus, the Court specifically rejected the government's contention that all lab reports, 
because they can be considered business records under the Military Rules of Evidence, 
are nontestimonial, and it noted that although lab reports and similar documents are 
often prepared as part of regularly conducted business, they can just as easily 
be prepared at the behest of law enforcement in anticipation of a 
prosecution, which may make the reports testimonial .... Thus, lab results 
or other types of routine records may become testimonial where a 
defendant is already under investigation, and where the testing is initiated 
by the prosecution to discover incriminating evidence. For example, cross- 
did not want to establish binding precedent on an important issue in a case where the government had 
not made a complete argument. See id. 
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examination may be appropriate where a particular defendant is accused of 
rape and law enforcement conducts and seeks to admit the results from a 
blood or DNA test. 
Id. at 127. In light of this standard, the Magyari Court held that lab reports showing that 
the urine of the accused had tested positive for methamphetamine were nontestimonial 
because they were generated through a random drug testing protocol; they were not 
specifically aimed at investigating a particular crime or generating evidence against the 
accused. Id. at 126-27; see also United States v. Wahila, 2006 WL 3523771, * I  (A.F. 
Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (following Magyari). 
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